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ABSTRACT
Coordination mechanisms for sustainable supply chain
management in pharmaceutical industry
Dua Weraikat, Ph.D.
Concordia University, 2016
At the beginning of the twenty-ﬁrst century, the human environmental problems
resulting from industrial manufacturing activities have aﬀected pharmaceutical supply
chain management. Governments have imposed legislations and policies on producers
to tackle the medications recovery process. Besides, customers social pressure plays a
major role in determining corporate sustainable strategies and performance measures.
Creative and proactive approaches are therefore necessary to reduce the introduction
of pharmaceutical wastes to the environment and to improve the sustainability of the
value chain.
In this dissertation, we propose diﬀerent coordination mechanisms for sustainable
pharmaceutical value chains inspired by traditional supply chains coordination mech-
anisms. For this purpose, a real case study for a generic pharmaceutical company,
Generic PharmaX, is considered. We ﬁrst focus on the reverse supply chain activities
in order to reduce medication leftovers at customer sites. We develop a negotiation-
based mechanism by the aid of a linear mathematical model to reﬂect the relationship
between the supply chain entities. Results show that up to 28% more products could
be collected if companies coordinate their operations eﬃciently. Moreover, the pro-
posed coordination approaches leads to a win-win situation for the reverse supply
chain entities, where each eﬀort is rewarded.
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Next, we explore the role of providing incentives to customers in order to facil-
itate leftover returns and improve the sustainability for the pharmaceutical reverse
supply chain. Coordination model is therefore presented between the producer and
third-party logistics companies, responsible for collecting unwanted medications from
customer zones. A technique is also proposed to share the expected saving between the
supply chain entities. The experimental results indicate that introducing incentives
to customers could decrease the amount of leftovers from 18% up to 6.5%. Further-
more, having a proper coordination with 3PL companies, in addition to customer
incentives, could guarantee a full medication recovery.
Finally, we focus on the inventory control management activities of the value
chain. The eﬀect of implementing a Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) system on
minimizing the quantity of expired medications at customer zones is investigated.
Results reveal that implementing the VMI system could improve the sustainability of
the supply chain. More precisely, the amount of expired medications could reach zero
against the current 18% expiration rate of shipped items. Some insights to guide the
supply chain entities through the VMI implementation are also provided.
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The depletion and overuse of natural resources, and their negative impacts on society
and economy, have been pointed out clearly and alarmingly by several comprehensive
studies. The current economic crisis, on the other hand, calls for supply chains to be
more cost eﬀective in order to survive and stay competitive in the marketplace. Thus,
environmental and economic pressures are pushing ﬁrms to tackle their social and
environmental responsibilities simultaneously. Regarding the new regulations, ﬁrms
are requested to address environmental issues in their supply chains and manage the
mounting cost threats to maintain competitiveness.
Recently, rigorous academic research has been dedicated to the study of the eﬀects
of coordination in improving supply chain eﬃciency. Nonetheless, and despite its
evident importance, the role of coordination on the success of greening supply chains
has been less investigated in the literature. Further investigations of real-world case
studies on the integration of sustainability in supply chain management are required
to ﬁnd some better practices for coordination mechanisms.
Motivated by a real case study in a generic pharmaceutical company, the focus
of this thesis is on proposing appropriate coordination mechanisms for sustainable
supply chain management. In this chapter, a description for the supply chain of the
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case study is presented. A preliminary analysis of its environmental complications
and challenges are also provided. The outline of the thesis is given at the end of this
chapter.
1.1 Generic PharmaX supply chain
Generic PharmaX, the producer, is a leading pharmaceutical producer that was
founded in the Middle East 39 years ago. The company focuses on developing a
branded pharmaceuticals business across the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and
in the United States. The activities of the Generic PharmaX Company start from
the sales and marketing unit, which works to get contracts and ﬁnd markets for their
products. Based on sales amount, the demand is planned through communication
with the ﬁnance department to check the available cash. The forecasting department
will improve the plan of demand and issue purchasing orders to buy raw materials
and equipment. Furthermore, purchasing activities in the company have speciﬁc per-
spectives and criteria. More precisely, the priority of performing a customer order
depends on the importance of that customer, the shelf life of raw materials, warehouse
capacity, holding cost, etc. Also, the suppliers are either from the national market
(for packaging materials, some basic chemicals and raw materials) or from interna-
tional markets (for active raw materials). The company manufactures two main forms
of drugs: liquid form and solid form. Legislations and regulation should be obeyed,
especially with toxic materials. Through quality assurance activity, the drugs are
tested before going to the packaging unit and later to warehouses. Based on pur-
chasing orders received from customers (i.e., pharmacies and hospitals), the producer
ships medications with respect to the regulations in the destination countries.
Any shortage in medications delivery has a high cost in terms of preventable
illness and death [1]. Therefore, customers tend to order more products from Generic
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PharmaX in order to be hedged against an unexpected demand. On the other hand,
medications have a ﬁxed shelf life set by a used-by or a sell-by date. They contain
some ingredients that degrade with time even when using modern keeping conditions
[2]. The expiration of the excess inventory in the absence of patients demand raises
more challenges on the pharmaceutical inventory control management, by trading oﬀ
stock outs and on-shelf availability against wastage due to expiry [3, 4].
The regulations imposed by governments on the producer oblige the company to
take care and collect any unused or expired medication at customer zones. Knowing
that the medications salvage value is very low, Generic PharmaX is not motivated to
invest in the recovery process. Instead, the producer contracts with one or more third-
party logistic (3PL) companies to collect these items at customer zones by oﬀering
non-negotiable collecting fees. Thereafter, 3PL companies collect the medications and
ship them to one of the governmental safe disposal sites. Consequently, the producer
pays disposal fees to the government for those shipped items. Currently, around 20%-
40% of medications at customer sites are remain uncollected by 3PL companies, which
incurs penalties to the producer. Figure 1 visualizes the process followed in Generic
PharmaX supply chain to take care of unused medications. Moreover, leaving expired
Figure 1: The current Generic PharmaX supply chain of collecting unused medications
medications at customer zones and disposing them improperly lead to penalties that
must be paid to governments. It might also turn into a jeopardy to people's health if
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being redistributed illegally in developing countries. This puts producers' reputation
in the market in peril due to the negative environmental footprint of their products.
Therefore, improving the PSC sustainability eﬀectively is essential not only to protect
the environment and patients from exposing to expired medications but also to reduce
the associated cost [2].
1.2 Outline of the thesis
The layout of the manuscript-based thesis consists of ﬁve chapters, which includes
three original contributions (presented as three articles), as follows. In chapter 1, a
description of the pharmaceutical supply chain activities and environmental challenges
is provided.
In chapter 2, we investigate the pharmaceutical reverse supply chain (RSC) of
Generic PharmaX. Since the RSC is usually not owned by a single company, a de-
centralized negotiation process is thus presented in order to coordinate the collection
of unwanted medications at customer zones. A Lagrangian relaxation method is used
to mimic the negotiation process. In addition, a bonus sharing technique is also
proposed in order to reward each entity's investment in the coordination process.
Chapter 3 explores the role of providing incentives to customers in order to fa-
cilitate leftover returns and improve the sustainability of the RSC. The chapter also
investigates the eﬀect of having a proper coordination method between the producer
and 3PL companies, responsible for collecting unwanted medications from customer
zones. Finally, a technique is proposed to share the RSC's saving among the producer
and the 3PL companies.
Chapter 4 seeks improving the sustainability the PSC for Generic PharmaX. An
analytical model is proposed to explore the eﬀect of implementing a Vendor-Managed
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Inventory (VMI) system on minimizing the quantity of expired medications at cus-
tomer zones. Furthermore, some insights for VMI implementation are provided.
A summary of the major contributions of the thesis is provided in chapter 5, along
with a discussion of possible research perspectives.
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Chapter 2
Coordinating a Green Reverse Supply
Chain in Pharmaceutical Sector by
Negotiation
This chapter is dedicated to the article entitles "Coordinating a Green Reverse Supply
Chain in Pharmaceutical Sector by Negotiation". A minor revision of the article has
been submitted to the Computers & Industrial Engineering journal on October 2015.
The titles, ﬁgures, and mathematical formulations have been revised to keep the
coherence through the thesis.
6
2.1 Abstract
This paper investigates the pharmaceutical reverse supply chain. For this industry,
the reverse supply chain is usually not owned by a single company. A decentralized
negotiation process is thus presented in order to coordinate the collection of unwanted
medications at customer zones. Using a Lagrangian relaxation method, the model is
solved for a real generic pharmaceutical company. Coordination eﬀorts are required
from the supply chain entities, facing environmental regulations, to collect and recycle
unwanted medications. Therefore, a bonus sharing technique is also proposed based
on each entity's investment in the coordination process. Some numerical results are
presented and discussed for two case studies. It shows that up to 28% more products
could be collected if companies coordinate their operations eﬃciently. Besides, future
insights on the same network are highlighted.
2.2 Introduction
Alterations in the state of the environment, which result from industrial manufactur-
ing activities, caused a quantum leap for the supply chain management (SCM) and
business practices. Customer pressure and environmental legislations also raise the
complexity for performance measurement of reverse supply chains (RSC). Up till now,
most of RSC actions are market-driven; i.e. companies take the initiative to reduce
costs by reusing the waste of unsold parts. However, in Europe some actions are
legislation-driven to fulﬁll the obligatory regulations of collecting speciﬁc amounts of
end-of-life products (return stream) in order to avoid penalties forced by governments
[5].
A good example is the pharmaceutical industry. In fact, this industrial ﬁeld has
developed at a very fast rate in the last decades. It is a rapidly growing market due
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to the increased rate of modern century diseases and the raised number of old-age
nations. Likewise, the presence of pharmaceutical products as trace pollutants for
environment has been ﬁrmly established. Knowing the potential severity of using
expired or improper drugs, the recovery process of unsold or unwanted medications is
essential [6]. A wide range of proactive actions is therefore necessary to reduce or min-
imize the introduction of pharmaceutical wastes to the environment. Pharmaceutical
RSC is considered as one of the complicated supply chains because of the restricted
percentages of chemicals in medications and the regulated conditions for distribution
and storage. Furthermore, the zero-salvage value of returned medications hinders the
development of RSC [7]. In other words, it diﬀers from other RSC, such as electronics
industry RSC, where the salvage value of the returned products is signiﬁcant.
This study focuses on tactical planning in the pharmaceutical RSC. In general,
tactical level decisions include many actions, such as collection of waste materials,
recycling, long-term RSC chain coordination contract drafting, recovery channels of
reverse logistics, and recovery eﬀorts designing [8, 9]. Since pharmaceutical RSC ac-
tivities fall outside core functions of a company, the majority of the activities are
usually handled through third-party logistics (3PL) providers [10]. Using 3PLs en-
ables companies to focus more on their own core processes and reduce the associated
costs. Moreover, 3PL providers usually update their information technology and tech-
niques, which are more ﬂexible than in-source logistics. Despite the aforementioned
advantages, some companies might lose control inherent in outsourcing particular
functions, due to the limited collaboration between the supply chain entities [11].
For example, in our case, due to the lack of collaboration, a part of unsold/expired
medications remains at customer zones.
In reality, supply chains are not typically owned by one company. They consist
of facilities that are managed by diﬀerent companies, like producers, retailers, 3PLs,
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etc. Hence decision-making system in such supply chains is bound to fail unless a
coherent approach of coordination is utilized. Coordination in networks are either a
centralized process that has a unique decision maker who possesses all information
on the entire network, or a decentralized process that has multiple decision makers
[12]. Product recovery problem is complex; i.e. many factors and constraints of
information sharing are required for accurate modeling. For example, information
are needed about collection volume, frequencies, locations, and cost associated with
collection and disposal [13]. In the pharmaceutical industry, paucity of information
may be observed as a result of the lack of trust between entities, hence, prohibiting
the coordination of the RSC [14]. This paper assumes a decentralized decision-making
process and proposes a negotiation approach as a coordination mechanism in the RSC
described herein.
We propose a coordination model for a real pharmaceutical RSC from the retailer
point of view, who represents the producer company, Generic PharmaX. In the past,
the producer policy did not include collecting the unsold items from outside the coun-
try because she believed that medications have a null salvage value. As a result, the
company, through her retailer, used to send new items instead and ask the retailer to
either burn or bury the unwanted drugs. This type of disposal harms the environment
and the groundwater. As a result, the environmental reputation of the company was
aﬀected.
Under the new business context, the producer pays the retailer for collecting the
unwanted or unused medications at customer zones (i.e. hospitals and pharmacies).
The retailer is thus responsible for negotiation with 3PLs over quantities that must
be collected, i.e. the retailer controls the reverse supply chain communication. The
retailer next pays fees, i.e. current collecting fees to 3PLs, for collecting the discarded
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medications at customer zones, as well as sorting and delivering to sinks of the net-
work. The sinks are governmental safe disposal and recycling facilities. Currently, the
coordination between the retailer and 3PL companies is insuﬃcient. In other words,
about 20% to 40% of the unwanted medications remain uncollected.
Because the company used to pay penalties to governments for uncollected med-
ications at customer zones, we suggest her to share that amount with RSC entities
instead and green her reputation. In other words, to minimize the fees and penalties
that she pays to governments, we suggest the producer to oﬀer the retailer an extra
ﬁxed amount, i.e. a bonus, on top of the regular collecting fees. The bonus is paid if,
and only if, all unwanted products at customer zones are collected. We believe that
this extra income for RSC entities will motivate those who are eager to collaborate
and participate in greening the network. Therefore, the retailer's objective is to en-
sure that all unwanted products are collected. As a result, the retailer has to pay
adequate collecting fees for 3PL companies to collect more products. Moreover, the
retailer needs to share the predictable bonus with the 3PLs to guarantee a complete
collection of products at customer zones. The reason is that the 3PLs objective is to
maximize the individual proﬁt from collecting products and from recycling some of
returned products.
This paper, as a ﬁrst research on the pharmaceutical RSC coordination, con-
tributes to the available literature by modeling this RSC in order to meet environ-
mental legislations and reduce the amount of wastes. It is a challenging RSC because
the recovered products have almost no economical values to recyclers or to produc-
ers. Using data from a real case study, a single period tactical planning model is
developed. The producer has to fulﬁll the regulations and improve her green image
among competitors and customers. The RSC model considered herein consists of
one retailer, four third-party logistics, and four recycling companies. A coordination
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approach based on a negotiation mechanism is applied to handle the communication
within the network. With the aid of Lagrangian relaxation, four sub-problems are
solved for small-case and large-case problems. In addition, an appropriate method to
share the network gain from an improved coordination is suggested, which shares the
savings based on each entity's eﬀort. Moreover, the eﬀect of the proposed coordina-
tion method on the performance of the RSC is analyzed.
The reminder of this paper is organized as follows. A literature review regarding
RSC and coordination mechanisms is ﬁrst proposed. A brief description of the case
study context and the pharmaceutical RSC tactical planning model are next given in
section 2.4. Also, section 2.4 covers the proposed negotiation methodology to solve
the model and the suggested proﬁt sharing technique. Some numerical results and
discussions for the real case study are given in section 2.5. Finally, some concluding
remarks are provided in section 2.6.
2.3 Literature Review
There is a growing stream of literature on product recovery and RSC. However, the
available literature on the pharmaceutical RSC is still limited and the existence re-
search is scant. Detailed reviews on RSC models can be found in [15, 16]. Blackburn
et al. [17] highlighted the growing interest in RSC in today's business. As the large
body of literature on RSC planning shows, mixed integer programming (MIP) models
are the common models for the quantitative planning of many case studies [18, 19].
However, most of the discussed models are for single facility problems. Very recently,
Brandenburg et al. [20] presented a holistic review of the available literature prior to
2014 on quantitative models for SCM including RSC. Lambert et al. [21] proposed a
conceptual framework for RSC including generic process decisions, economic aspects,
and performance measures with respect to the tactical level decisions. Sbihi and
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Eglese [13] focused on combinatorial optimization problems in a network with waste
management and reverse logistics. Hoshino et al. [22] constructed a linear goal pro-
gramming model to maximize the total proﬁt and recycling rate for recycle-oriented
manufacturing systems. Likewise, Karakayal et al. [23] investigated the pricing and
recovery planning problem in a single-period setting. By using a target rebate-punish
contract, Yan and Sun [24] modeled a multi-echelon RSC for a scrap recycling. Their
results on a steel RSC, involving a manufacturer and multi- 3PLs companies, revealed
that the target rebate-punish may coordinate the RSC under certain conditions.
Regarding the literature on pharmaceutical RSC, few works can be found. Shih
and Lin [25] presented a multiple criteria optimization approach to minimize the cost
for collection system planning for medical waste. Recently, Kumar et al. [10] pro-
posed a framework to state each party's responsibility in the pharmaceutical RSCs.
They suggested the usage of consistent information systems and carriers to streamline
the supply chain. The absence of collaboration in their model with 3PLs draws into
question the ability of the model in tracking the products. In addition, the study
ignored the criterion of sharing any possible beneﬁts of using this technology as well
as sharing the implementation cost among the entities. Lately, Xie and Breen [7]
designed a green pharmaceutical supply chain model to reduce preventable pharma-
ceutical waste and to dispose inevitable waste. The study revealed that the RSC is
not really utilized in the pharmaceutical industry since returned medications cannot
be reused or resold. Hence, with the new environmental regulations, supplier collab-
oration and customer cooperation were addressed to boost the RSC. However, the
cost of recycling or collecting returned/unwanted medications was not considered.
Collaboration in supply chains can be deﬁned as a long-term relationship among
entities through sharing resources and knowledge. Camarinha-Motas [26] presented
a holistic overview on the key concepts, classiﬁcations, and some applications related
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to collaboration. The relevant literature on coordination and collaboration in RSC
is very recent because of the complexity in these chains. Examples on the intricacies
are anti-trust problems, lost of control, and the inherent uncertainty, such as local
policies, quality of returned products, etc [27]. To reduce uncertainty, eﬀorts are
needed to increase the coordination in the RSC by changing the relationship between
cost-value-proﬁt equations [28]. One of the coordination mechanisms that we focus on,
herein, is negotiation process. However, most of the available literature, concerning
this coordination mechanism, is on the forward supply chain.
Jung et al. [29] proposed a negotiation process for a distributor and a manufac-
turer to ﬁnd a feasible plan for supply quantities from the manufacturer to the distrib-
utor with a minimum amount of information revelation to partners. They stated that
complete information sharing is essential to solve centralized planning model. Dudek
ans Stadtler [30, 31] suggested using some incentives to boost the negotiation process.
Li [32] examined the incentives in a two-level supply chain (one manufacturer and
many retailers). His study expressed that the direct and leakage eﬀects of information
sharing discourage retailers from collaboration. Hence, Cachon [33] suggested the use
of contracts based on ﬁve types of incentives to facilitate the coordination of partners'
activities in the forward supply chain. One of the incentives can be the price charged
by the supplier to the customer, which is known as wholesale-price. The second is
the use of buyback policy of returning all unsold items. When the retailers have a
portion of the revenue as an incentive, they will go for long-term collaboration, as
they will be part of the proﬁt cycle. Another incentive is to give some ﬂexibility to
the supplier of the demand over the minimum quantity to provide. Finally, reducing
the cost by increasing the quantity will encourage the buyer to have more. Recently,
Lehoux et al. [34] studied a two-echelon supply chain in the pulp and paper industry.
They explained that using diﬀerent coordination mechanisms provided higher gains
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for network entities. Moreover, Kusukawa and Arizono [35] suggested a proﬁt sharing
mechanism for a forward supply chain. Bellantuono and Pontrandolfo [36] proposed
four contract-based models to share the salvage and recovery values of a closed-loop
supply chain.
In reality, as mentioned earlier, the information access between RSC entities is very
limited. Therefore, Walther et al. [37] developed a decentralized negotiation model
to enable allocating product recovery tasks for recycling companies. Lagrangian re-
laxation optimization method was used to solve the model. The method was applied
to an electronic case study in Europe. It can be said that, up till recently, Walther et
al. [37] research is the only mathematical model available in the literature for coordi-
nation in RSC. The recovery activities in the electronic industry have a value-added
to the supply chain income. However, in the pharmaceutical industry, the salvage
value of the medication recovery is almost negligible. Hence, coordination approach
in the latter is more challenging. Furthermore, the proﬁt sharing among the network
entities was not studied in [37]. Since the negotiation requires an invested eﬀort from
RSC entities, this should be rewarded by sharing the beneﬁts among the entities. In
our contribution, we present a negotiation process as well as a technique to share the
savings based on invested eﬀorts for each entity.
2.4 The Model
2.4.1 RSC Single Period Tactical Planning Problem in the
Case Study
As estated earlier, the producer of medications, Generic PharmaX, is facing govern-
mental legislations to green her supply chain activities. Moreover, she used to pay
penalties to governments for uncollected medications at customer zones. Therefore, in
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order to help the producer improving her RSC, we propose her a coordination model
to guarantee the collection of all available amounts of medications at customer zones.
However, because the medication recovery process involves a certain logistics cost but
a small salvage value, the coordination model in such supply chains is bound to fail
unless a motivation technique is utilized to encourage RSC entities to collaborate.
This mechanism is shown in ﬁgure (2). The ﬁgure depicts the RSC entities of the
proposed coordination model and illustrates the interaction among them.
Figure 2: The Pharmaceutical RSC based on the Proposed Coordination Model
Since the RSC activities fall outside core functions of the producer, the majority of
those activities are outsourced. The producer pays a retailer for collecting medications
at customer zones. More precisely, she pays the retailer a price of RVi for collecting
1 kg of product type i. The retailer, as a representative of the producer in the
RSC, controls the RSC activities. However, the retailer is not qualiﬁed to handle the
returns by himself. Hence, he contracts with one or more third-party logistics (3PL)
companies to pick up and recycle the leftover medications at customer zones. With
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the goal of greening the RSC, the retailer, as the representative of the producer in
the RSC, sets a target for recycling certain percentages (αi) of the total medication
collected by 3PL companies at customer zones. 3PL companies reach the target
through sending the collected mass to recyclers, which are assumed to be under their
control. Furthermore, in order to avoid penalties due to the uncollected medications
at customer zones, the retailer needs to make sure all leftovers are collected by 3PL
companies. Hence, the retailer proposes a contract to 3PL companies. The contract
has two parameters; the ﬁrst parameter stands for collecting fees for one unit of
product type i at customer zone k (calculated collecting fees piik). On the other
hand, the recycling process is infrequent in the pharmaceutical industry because it
has almost no economical values to 3PL companies. Therefore, in order to motivate
the 3PL companies to recycle some medications, the second parameter is oﬀered by
the retailer for each unit recycled from the collected medications (bonus payment λ).
In the light of the contract oﬀers, the role of 3PL companies is to pick up the available
medications at customer zones (Qikl). Furthermore, 3PL companies have to deliver
the medications, after sorting and separating them, to the RSC sinks; encompassing
government safe disposal and diﬀerent recycling facilities.
As aforementioned, the retailer requests a certain percentage from each product
to be recycled (αi). Therefore, the 3PL companies have to meet the recycling mass
required by the retailer (αi.Qikl). Then, 3PL companies send the mass (QRilr) to
recycling facilities as shown in ﬁgure (2). In the recycling facilities, the medications
are disassembled to packaging, containers, etc. The recyclable fraction of a medication
type i at recycling facilities is represented as βikl. The recyclable amounts of the
delivered medications at recycling facilities should at least reach the target imposed by
the retailer (βikl.QRilr ≥ αi.Qikl). By the same token, the recycled masses at recycling
facilities are fractions of the collected amounts at customer zones (βikl.QRilr). The
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recycling facilities sell the recycled mass in recycled medication markets, at a price
of PRi. For example, an ethanol of 98% purity can be extracted from medications
and sold to paints factories, where it can be used as a solvent in paints. At last,
hazardous and non-recyclable medications have to be sent to the governmental safe
disposal facilities to be disposed in a secure area (QDil). Based on this context, a
mathematical model for the case study can be formulated as shown in the following
sections.
Centralized Model
Currently, the retailer contracts with many 3PLs to collect the unwanted products
based on ﬁxed non-negotiable prices (current collecting fees) as follows. The re-
tailer has the information about the available amounts at each customer zone, i.e.
she has the power over other entities. She informs 3PLs with contract parameters
(current collecting fees and recycling targets) for collecting medications. Then, each
3PL company sends the retailer the amount that they are willing to collect. Each
3PL company's objective is to maximize her proﬁt of collecting with respect to her
own collecting cost, transportation cost, and collection and recycling capacities. In
contrary, the retailer's goal is to fulﬁll the recovery targets.
A comprehensive solution for the whole RSC could be obtained if the retailer has
all the required information for each 3PL company. She could manage and assign
each 3PL company an amount to collect in order to ensure a complete collection for
the medications. Following is the model in case of full information availability to the
retailer, corresponding to RSC depicted in ﬁgure (2).
Indices and Sets
i index of products, i ∈ I
k index of customers (hospitals and pharmacies), k ∈ K
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l index of 3PL, l ∈ L
r index of recyclers, r ∈ R
Parameters
RVi Price for collecting 1 kg of product type i ($/kg) paid by the producer to
the retailer, i.e., retailer's revenue
PRi Revenue for recycling 1 kg of product type i ($/kg)
Pi Fees paid to government to dispose 1 kg of product type i ($/kg)
RCir Recycling cost of product i at recycler r
DCil Cost for collecting and sorting product type i at 3PL l
TCikl Transportation costs of 1 kg of product type i from customer k to 3PL l
TCRilr Transportation costs of 1 kg of product type i from 3PL l to recycler r
TDil Transportation costs of 1 kg of product type i from 3PL l to governmental
safe disposal
αi Recycling percentage of product type i
Mik Mass of product type i that has to be collected at customer k
CAPl Capacity available at 3PL l ($)
CAPRr Capacity available at recycler r ($)
βikl a fraction of medication type i collected by 3PL l at customer k that can
be recycled after disassembly process
Decision Variables
Qikl Mass of discarded product type i delivered from customer k to 3PL l
QRilr Mass of discarded product type i delivered from 3PL l to recycler r
QDil Mass of discarded product type i delivered from 3PL l to government safe
disposal sink
recrl Total mass approved to be sent to recycling facility r by 3PL l
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RSC centralized model
The objective function (1) maximizes the total proﬁt of the RSC.
Maximize Z = RevCollecting + RevRecycling
−CtCollecting −CtRecycling −CtDisposal (1)
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(RCir + TCRilr)QRilr). Medication safe disposal fees






The model is constrained by conservation of ﬂow through network channels and
capacity constraints for recycling facilities and for each 3PL company site. In addition,
the masses that have to be sent to each recycling facility are considered, based on
the percentage of recycling of that product type. In other words, each product has a
possibility to recycle part of it, for example packages, etc. The recycled masses have
to meet the recycling target of each product. Moreover, all of unsold products at













































Qikl ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K (7)
Qikl, QRilr, QDil, recrl ≥ 0
i ∈ I, k ∈ K, r ∈ R, l ∈ L (8)
The ﬁrst constraint (2) ensures the conservation of mass ﬂow on the 3PLs node;
masses collected from customer k equal to masses sent to recycling plus masses sent
to governmental sink. Constraints (3) explains the capacity of the recyclers in dollars
as a unit of medication type i delivered from 3PL l to recyclers r multiply by trans-
portation costs of 1 kg of product type i from 3PL l to recyclers r. Constraint (4) is a
capacity constraint in dollars for 3PL company and it is calculated by multiplying the
cost of 1 kg collected from product type i with the collected masses of that medication
type i. Constraint (5) calculates the masses that have to be sent to each recycling
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facility by multiplying the collected masses of product type i with the percentage of
recycling of that product type. Constraint (6) guarantees that the recycled masses
at least reach the target of recycling of product type i. Constraint (7) conﬁrms that
all of unsold product type i at customer k are collected and moved to 3PL facilities.
The last constraints are non-negativity constraints.
However, the 3PLs might not accept the prices and quantities oﬀered by the re-
tailer or would not agree to share their information. It therefore becomes necessary
to model the tactical planning problem in a decentralized manner and to use a mech-
anism in order to coordinate it eﬃciently.
Coordination Model Based on Negotiation Approach
Solving the centralized model, as mentioned earlier, needs private information sharing
between RSC entities. As some examples we can mention the capacity available at
3PLs (CAPl), transportation cost from 3PLs to recyclers (TCRilr), transportation
cost from 3PLs to safe disposal (TDil), and so on. In fact, RSC entities are not
currently willing to share this knowledge with others. Moreover, some constraints
are common constraints for all 3PLs, such as collecting all of unwanted medications
(constraint (7)). Therefore, a decentralized approach is needed to reﬂect business
reality.
Inspired by [37], a negotiation-based coordination approach is suggested to opti-
mize the value of collected quantities and the collecting fees. The retailer leads the
negotiation process and oﬀers calculated collecting and recycling fees to 3PLs. The
oﬀers and reactions are exchanged until both parties agreed upon certain values of
the parameters, as summarized in ﬁgure (3).
Looking at the structure of the centralized model, it can been seen that constraints
(5) and (7) are related to the retailer, who tries to ensure the collection and recycling
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Figure 3: Negotiation Procedure in the Pharmaceutical RSC
of medications. However, those constraints are dependent constraints based on pri-
vate information of 3PLs. In other words, by deleting constraints (5) and (7) from
the centralized model, a sub-model for each 3PL company can be obtained. Even
so, those deleted constraints have to be satisﬁed in order to solve the model. There-
fore, the retailer proposes contract oﬀers to 3PLs and checks the collected amounts.
Two parameters are considered as contract parameters: piik and λ. piik is calculated
collecting fees paid by the retailer for collecting one mass unit of product type i at
customer k. Besides, in order to green the supply chain, λ is a given bonus payment
to 3PLs for the recycled amount of collected products. If not all of the medications
are collected, the retailer will revise the contract oﬀers (ﬁgure (3)).
This negotiation process can be mathematically represented by the aid of La-
grangian relaxation method. Details of Lagrangian relaxation method can be found
in [38, 39]. More precisely, the retailer relaxes the common constraints (constraints
(5) and (7)) and adds them to the objective function of the model as shown in equa-
tion (9). Also, the violation of the constraints is penalized in the objective function
by Lagrangian multipliers (the contract parameters). The extra notations used in the
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negotiation process are shown below.
Coordination model notations
ZLR(λ, piik) is the objective function of the RSC Lagrangian relaxation model;
ZLR(λ, piik)
∗ is the optimal objective function value of the RSC Lagrangian relaxation
model;
Zl(λ, piik) is the objective function for each 3PL model l;
Z
∗




l (λ, piik) is the summation of optimal objective function values for all 3PL com-
panies.
Lagrangian Relaxation function of the RSC model
ZLR(λ, piik)













































































After some rearrangements for equation (9), we can rewrite the same equation (equa-
tion (9)) for the RSC model as shown in equation (10). More mathematical details
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From equation (10), a separate model is extracted for each 3PL company with a
proﬁt maximization objective function as shown in equation (11) and with respect to
constraints (12)-(16). The 3PL model generates an optimal local plan for each 3PL
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QRilr +QDil ∀i ∈ I (12)
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βikl.QRilr ∀r ∈ R (15)
Qikl, QRilr, QDil, recr ≥ 0
i ∈ I, k ∈ K, r ∈ R, l ∈ L (16)
Solving the Lagrangian relaxation model starts with proposing values for λ and
piik by the retailer. Each 3PL company solves the model to ﬁnd the optimal plans
and presents the values to the retailer. Afterwards, the retailer checks the common
constraints based on 3PLs' values. If the common constraints are not satisﬁed, the
retailer reviews the values again and iterates over them with 3PLs. As mentioned
before, no information is shared between entities. Consequently, a sub-gradient pro-
cedure of Lagrangian dual function is used to get a global optimal of this model.




Qtikl be the optimal value of
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Equation (17) is the sub-gradient function of the corresponding relaxed constraint
(constraint (7)) at pitik, i.e. g
t
piik
represents the violation of the relaxed constraint
in iteration t. As long as the relaxed constraint is unsatisﬁed, the new Lagrangian







where µt is a positive scalar step size at iteration t and is calculated as µt = b/t||g||, b
is a scalar quantity and ||g|| is the Euclidean norm of the sub-gradient. By the same
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represents the violation of the corresponding relaxed constraint (constraint (5)) at
iteration t. As long as the relaxed constraint is unsatisﬁed, the Lagrangian multiplier
is updated as follows:
λt+1 = max(0, λt + µt.g
t
λ) (20)
The process is repeated for a number of iterations until both relaxed constraints are
satisﬁed.
The solution of the sub-model is not necessarily an optimal solution for the centralized
network model. Therefore, the solution space of the model needs to be restricted to
generate a global feasible solution. We add a new constraint to the sub-model (11)-
(16) in order to ensure that the maximum value of the collected product has to be
less than or equal to the maximum available medication for each 3PL company. The
value of Qmaxikl is a fraction of the available masses (equation (21)):
Qikl ≤ Qmaxikl ∀i, k, l (21)
The aforementioned procedure runs until the targeted amounts in constraints (5)
and (7) are collected. Based on the assigned values to each 3PL company, the retailer
calculates her cost, which is the money paid to each 3PL company and the money paid
to the government (for safe disposal and penalty for uncollected masses at customer
zones). Also, the 3PLs calculate their cost along with their revenue.
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2.4.2 Sharing the Bonus Between RSC Entities
As mentioned earlier, the retailer is willing to share her bonus, received from the
producer, with RSC entities based on their coordination eﬀorts. Motivated by a
recent work of [35], the following is a suggested procedure for sharing the bonus
between the retailer and 3PLs.
1. Find the diﬀerence between the collected amount in the proposed negotiation-
based approach with the current collected amounts (based on Generic PharmaX
historical data) (∆E = Qnegotiation−basedikl −Qhistoricalikl ).
2. If ∆E > 0, calculate the cost of collecting this diﬀerence based on the negotiation-
based model for each 3PL company.
3. Calculate the investment rates (N ) of the 3PL company in both cases (the case
of negotiation-based approach and the current collected amount) as:
N3PL =
The cost of collecting ∆E
Total cost of collecting Qnegotiation−basedikl
and for the retailer calculate the ratio as the money paid to 3PLs divided by











4. Calculate the share of the retailer and 3PL from the bonus (S) as:
S3PL = Bonus.N
nor




2.5 Numerical Results and Discussions
Through the communication with the head of Generic PharmaX supply chain de-
partment, the required data were obtained from the producer. The data were next
reﬁned based on the top markets and medication groups of the company. The four
3PLs were also selected among the largest collectors, where the top four and twenty
medications selling amounts were selected for the small and large cases, respectively.
The model was solved for small and large cases using Lagrangian relaxation. Results
are given for 4 third-party logistics and 4 recyclers. Each 3PL company has diﬀerent
values for transportation and recycling costs, capacities, location, etc. Table 1 shows
the capacity for each 3PL company.
Table 1: Third-Party Logistics Capacities ($)
Large case Small case
3PL 1 4,700.00 75.00
3PL 2 3,000.00 100.00
3PL 3 4,560.00 78.00
3PL 4 2,850.00 150.00
The next sections describe the results from the negotiation-based model and the
real amounts of the collected medications which have led to some managerial insights.
Each entity eﬀort is also rewarded by sharing the bonus of the network. Finally, a
validation of the results is presented for the shared amounts between RSC entities
and corresponding costs.
2.5.1 Negotiation Model Results
As we mentioned earlier, the main concern in this research is how to coordinate
independent RSC players towards a common goal for the network. Negotiation was
therefore used as a way to encourage 3PLs to recover as much products as possible
while taking into account both retailer and 3PLs constraints. The model was solved
by relaxing the two common constraints (Equations (5) and (7)) and penalizing them
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in the objective function. Using Cplex, the model was run for many iterations and
evaluated for diﬀerent values of b. The used values for b were 5, 10, and 30. When all
the available amounts (Mik) were collected, we stop running the model. With respect
to the step size, small step sizes resulted in smaller optimality gap, i.e. more stable
results. The values of calculated collecting fees, piik, were varied as shown in the
second column of Table 2. The current collecting fees are given in the third column
in the same table. The last row in the table corresponds to the price of each mass
of unwanted medications that is approved to be recycled. The last four columns in
the table represent the Qikl that has been collected by each 3PL company. Similar
table for large scale problem (i.e., twenty products are recovered) is given in the
Appendices.
Table 2: Small Case: Collecting fees , recycling bonus ($/kg), and amounts assigned for
each 3PL
Calculated collecting fees Current collecting fees 3PL 1 3PL 2 3PL 3 3PL 4
pi11 0 0.5 3.75 3.75 3.75 3.75
pi12 0.224 0.5 9 9 9 9
pi13 0.388 0.5 7.5 7.5 7.5 7.5
pi14 0.015 0.5 1.25 1.25 1.25 1.25
pi21 0.495 0.45 8.75 8.75 8.75 8.75
pi22 0.793 0.45 11.36 11.36 11.375 11.375
pi23 0.012 0.45 6.38 6.38 6.38 6.375
pi24 0.089 0.45 2.5 2.5 2.5 2.5
pi31 0.583 3.55 0 4 2.75 4.25
pi32 2.718 3.55 4.60 13.75 13.75 22.90
pi33 4.340 3.55 21 21 21 21
pi34 3.061 3.55 13.75 21.25 0 20
λ 0.306 - - - - -
It can be seen, in table 2, that some of the calculated collecting fees are lower
than the current collecting fees and some are higher. For example in the small case,
for product type 3 at customer zone 3, pi33, the current collecting fees is lower than
calculated collecting fees in the coordinated model. Since 3PL 2 and 3PL 4 fully
utilize their capacities, the assignable amount to 3PL 1 or 3PL 3 cannot be taken
by them. Hence, the retailer has to increase the calculated collecting fees up to a
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certain limit where 3PL 1 and 3PL 3 can collect all jobs allocated to them. On the
other hand, 3PL 2 and 3PL 4 gain more from the higher calculated collecting fees.
The reason is that 3PL 2 and 3PL 4 could collect the allocated quantities with lower
contractual collecting fees, as shown in Table 3.
The proﬁt of each RSC entity is given in the ﬁrst four rows of Table 3. 3PL 4 has
the largest proﬁt for the small case, where for the large case, 3PL 1 has the largest
proﬁt. Also, the transfer payment from the retailer to each 3PL is given in rows from
6-9. The total transfer payments are given in row 10. It is calculated by multiplying
the calculated collecting fees (piik) and recycling bonus (λ) with the collected and
recycled amounts.
Table 3: Proﬁts and Transfer Payments Paid to 3PLs
Small case Large case
Proﬁt of 3PL 1(in $1000) 1,796.9 146,179.0
Proﬁt of 3PL 2 (in $1000) 1,705.9 106,507.2
Proﬁt of 3PL 3 (in $1000) 1,478.9 122,533.3
Proﬁt of 3PL 4(in $1000) 1,884.8 111,871.9
Total proﬁts of 3PL companies (in $1000) 6,866.2 487,091.3
Transfer payments from the retailer to 3PL 1 (in $1000) 2,074.2 7,578.6
Transfer payments from the retailer to 3PL 2 (in $1000) 2,065.3 2,625.6
Transfer payments from the retailer to 3PL 3 (in $1000) 1,690.2 4,481.0
Transfer payments from the retailer to 3PL 4 (in $1000) 2,205.1 3,229.8
Total transfer payments 8,034.8 17,915.1
Capacity utilization of 3PL 1 (%) 88 100
Capacity utilization of 3PL 2 (%) 100 78
Capacity utilization of 3PL 3 (%) 86 100
Capacity utilization of 3PL 4 (%) 100 90
The retailer has to pay an extra $312.675 thousands to ensure that all products for
the small case are collected. This is calculated as the diﬀerence between the current
collecting fees minus the calculated collecting fees in the coordination model. By the
same token, we calculated the value for this large scale as $1,807.34 thousands.
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2.5.2 Results Validation and Bonus Sharing
To understand the eﬀect of diﬀerent collecting fees on the collected amounts, the
model was solved using the current collecting fees as Lagrangian multipliers in the
sub-model (11)-(16). The results show that the current collecting fees leads to lower
collected amounts than the collected amount in the coordinated model. In particular,
up to 28% more products are collected for small case and up to 18% in case of
large scale problem when the RSC is coordinated, as it can be observed in Table 4.
In the small case, based on the governmental penalties for not collecting unwanted
medications, the uncollected amounts with the current collecting fees would cost
Generic PharmaX around $2 millions. In the large scale problem, the penalties could
be around $93 millions.
Table 4: Total Amounts Collected (kg) with Diﬀerent Collecting Fees
Coordinated model Current situation
Small Case Total collected amounts 407 294.64
Total uncollected amounts 0 112.36
Large case Total collected amounts 24,060 19,768.48
Total uncollected amounts 0 4,291.51
In table 5, we compare the proﬁt of each entity for the small and the large case
regarding the actual collecting fees and the collecting fees in the coordinated model.
For 3PL 2, 3PL 3, and 3PL 4, it can be seen that their proﬁts in the coordinated
model are less than their proﬁts in the current model for the small case. As a result,
they have to gain some extra bonus in order to be encouraged to collaborate with
the retailer and to be compensated for proﬁt lost. However, for the large scale, all
of the 3PLs have increased their proﬁts. We therefore investigated the impact of
diﬀerent values of bonus paid by Generic PharmaX to the retailer on the RSC using
the procedure mentioned earlier.
Tables 6 and 7 provide the part of the bonus obtained by each 3PL company and
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Table 5: Proﬁt Comparison (in $1,000)
Coordinated model Current status The diﬀerence
Small case
3PL 1 1,796.89 1,522.54 271.35
3PL 2 1,705.92 1,966.67 -260.75
3PL 3 1,478.9 1,674.12 -195.22
3PL 4 1,884.84 2,176.85 -292.01
Retailer* -763.087 -450.675 -312.41
Large case
3PL 1 146,179 112,011.32 34,167.68
3PL 2 106,507.2 91,973.51 14,533.69
3PL 3 122,533.3 116,231.73 6,301.572
3PL 4 111,871.9 90,980.38 20,891.52
Retailer* -19,768.5 -17,915.13 -1,853.37
* Since the fees, paid by the producer to the retailer, are constant, they are neglected from the calculations for the
retailer.
by the retailer from diﬀerent amounts paid by the producer (Generic PharmaX) for
collecting the whole amount of unwanted medications at customer zones. The ﬁrst
row of the aforementioned tables provides diﬀerent amounts of bonus while the rest
of the rows provide the bonus shared based on the procedure proposed in subsection
2.4.2.
Table 6: Small Case: Bonus Sharing Between RSC Entities (in $1,000)
N Nnor3PL $500 $1,500 $2,000 $2,100 $2,200 $2,250 $2,300
3PL 1 0.23 0.12 60 180 240 252 264 270 276
3PL 2 0.87 0.45 225 675 900 945 990 1,012.5 1,035
3PL 3 0.19 0.11 55 165 220 231 242 247.5 253
3PL 4 0.36 0.18 90 270 360 378 396 405 414
Retailer 0.28 0.14 70 210 280 308 308 315 322
As we can see in table 6, a bonus of $500 thousands would only be proﬁtable for
3PL 1 since it is the only entity that has a positive proﬁt. However, it is not the case
for the rest of RSC entities. Expressly, by looking at table 5, we can see that 3PL 2
will loose about $260 thousands via a negotiation protocol. By considering a bonus
of only $500 thousands, the part obtained by 3PL 2 would be of $225 thousands,
which is less than the loss by about $35 thousands. For the $1,500 thousands bonus
scenario, this would be beneﬁcial for 3PL 1 and 3PL 2 but not for the rest of RSC
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entities. The third scenario of $2,000 thousands is valuable for all 3PLs but not for the
retailer. The sixth scenario is satisfactory for all RSC entities. Henceforth, the oﬀered
bonus by Generic PharmaX has to be greater than or equal to $2,250 thousands to
ensure that every RSC entity gains some bonus and that the loss due to accepting
the coordinated collecting fees is compensated.
Table 7: Large Case: Bonus Sharing Between RSC Entities (in $1,000)
N Nnor3PL $50,000 $60,000 $65,000 $70,000 $75,000 $80,000
3PL 1 0.284 0.205 10,227.854 12,273.425 13,296.210 14,318.995 15,341.781 16,364.566
3PL 2 0.179 0.128 6,422.977 7,707.573 8,349.870 8,992.168 9,634.466 10,276.763
3PL 3 0.115 0.0830 4,147.280 4,976.736 5,391.464 5,806.192 6,220.912 6,635.648
3PL 4 0.412 0.296 14,816.722 17,780.067 19,261.739 20,743.411 22,225.083 23,706.755
Retailer 0.400 0.288 14,385.167 17,262.201 18,700.717 20,139.234 21,577.751 23,016.267
For the large case (table 7), it can be seen that any amount of the bonus would be
beneﬁcial for the 3PLs. However, the retailer's eﬀort would be rewarded in the case
the producer pays at least $65,000 thousands as a bonus. In this case, the producer
would not only avoid paying penalties, but also could save around $30,952 thousands
of the money that she used to pay to government. From the results, we can see
that if partners agree on better coordinating their activities, more products could be
collected. The latter would lead to a green supply chain for the producer while the
investment of other supply chain entities would be rewarded.
2.6 Conclusion
The pharmaceutical industry has developed at a very fast rate in the last decades,
facing a rapidly growing market. However, environmental and governmental changes
pressurize the companies to step ahead and change their practices. The recovery pro-
cess and reverse supply chains of unsold or unwanted medications become an essential
asset for this industry. A wide range of proactive actions could be implemented in the
supply chain for reducing or minimizing the amount of pharmaceutical wastes left in
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the environment.
The pharmaceutical supply chain is a complex decision-making system at the tac-
tical level. In general, it includes many actions, such as placement of waste materials
recycling, long-term RSC chain coordination contract drafting, recovery channels of
reverse logistics, and recovery eﬀorts designing [8, 9]. Since pharmaceutical RSC ac-
tivities fall outside core functions of a company, the majority of the activities are
handled through third-party logistics providers (3PL) [10]. Hence, the reverse supply
chain is not usual to be managed by one company. To optimize the network eﬃciency,
eﬀective coordination mechanism is necessary.
This paper has addressed the coordination method in a RSC of a real pharmaceu-
tical case study. Inspired by Walther et al. [37], we developed a negotiation-based
mechanism by the aid of a linear mathematical model that reﬂects the relationship be-
tween the retailer (producer representative) and several 3rd party logistics companies.
The model was decentralized and a sub-model for each 3PL company was extracted.
In order to solve the sub-models, the Lagrangian relaxation method was used. Nu-
merical results for a small and a large case study were obtained and discussed. Finally,
a bonus was shared between the RSC entities based on their contribution to the sup-
ply chain. Results show that coordination could ensure the complete collection of
all unsold medications at customer zones. As a result, the producer would not pay
penalties and she will be in a good reputation in the market. At the same time, the
proposed coordination approaches leads to a win-win situation for the reverse supply
chain entities, where each eﬀort is rewarded. It is worth mentioning that implement-
ing this way of coordination is not straight forward. RSC coordination is still a new
reality for many of the network entities who are change reluctant.
Further research is necessary to involve customers (3rd echelon) of the network in
the coordination model and introduce some incentives for their coordination eﬀorts.
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Considering a multi-period tactical planning model could also be investigated. Finally,
a thorough examination of how this new planning approach could be implemented
would be relevant.
2.7 Appendices
2.7.1 RSC Lagrangian Relaxation mathematical details
Lagrangian Relaxation function of the RSC model is provided in equation (9) as
follows;
ZLR(λ, piik)













































































After aggregating the terms with similar indices in equation (9), we can rewrite the



































It can be noticed that in equation (22) all the terms, except the last one, are related




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Supply Chain Coordination with
Customers Incentives
This chapter is dedicated to the article entitles "Two-echelon Pharmaceutical Reverse
Supply Chain Coordination with Customers Incentives". It has been submitted to
the International Journal of Production Economics on May 2015. The titles, ﬁgures,




In the pharmaceutical industry, leftover medications that have not been properly
disposed not only damage the environment but also might turn into a peril to people's
health if being redistributed illegally in undeveloped countries. In contrary, if they are
returned to the pharmaceutical producer before their expiry dates, they can be sold
at subsidized prices or donated in such countries. In this research, we explore the role
of providing incentives to customers in order to facilitate leftover returns and improve
the sustainability for a real pharmaceutical reverse supply chain (RSC). Moreover,
this research investigates the eﬀect of having a proper coordination method between
a producer of medications and third-party logistics (3PL) companies, responsible for
collecting unwanted medications from customer zones. Finally, a technique is also
proposed to share the RSC's saving among the producer and the 3PL companies.
The experimental results on a real case study indicate that introducing incentives to
customers could decrease the amount of uncollected medications from 18% up to 6.5%.
Furthermore, having a proper coordination with 3PL companies could guarantee a
full medication recovery.
3.2 Introduction
The pharmaceutical industry has witnessed signiﬁcant changes in recent years. New
regulations have been imposed by governments for tackling the recovery of unwanted/
expired medications at diﬀerent customer zones [10]. Hospitals and pharmacies, as
the main consumers of medications, are faced with uncertain and ﬂuctuating demand.
Since the shortage of certain medications might lead to severe consequences for pa-
tients, customers might adopt a conservative inventory control policy through keeping
large quantities of drugs in stock. Given the perishable nature of medications, such
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a strategy would lead to the expiration of excess inventory in the absence of patients
demand. In contrary, if unwanted medications are returned to the producer prior to
the end of their shelf-lives, they can be either sold in subsidiary markets or donated
in developing and undeveloped countries. This humanitarian aid could improve the
quality of health care in such communities. Accordingly, improving the reverse supply
chain (RSC) is one way to gain and maintain strategic advantages in this industry.
Medications recovery process is complex in the sense that information about avail-
able amounts of leftovers, the willingness of customers to return medications, and the
cost associated with the collection and disposal processes are not always known by
the producer [13]. The paucity of such information could be indeed the result of the
lack of trust and coordination between producers, customers, and 3PL companies.
Moreover, the direct and leakage eﬀects of information sharing discourage companies
from collaboration [32]. Hence an eﬃcient decision-making process in such RSCs is
bound to fail unless a coherent coordination mechanism is utilized [14].
While many studies have investigated the impact of coordination on forward sup-
ply chain networks [40, 41], the literature is scant on the beneﬁts of coordination in
RSC networks. The available literature is limited to the proﬁtable RSCs, such as the
electronics recovery networks [37, 42]. This is due to the possibility of reusing the
precious metals in such networks. On the other hand, knowing the complexity of the
pharmaceutical RSC, little attention has been addressed for the coordination of this
speciﬁc value chain. The negligible salvage value of the expired medications has also
encumbered the investment in this RSC.
In this research, we investigate the use of coordination methods to ensure full med-
ication recovery while sharing the savings fairly between members of a pharmaceutical
RSC. The current structure of this pharmaceutical RSC involves the producer, the
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3PL companies, and the RSC customers. We can observe that hospitals and phar-
macies, as the RSC customers, keep medications to expire at their sites; then, they
inform the producer about the quantity of the expired medications. Because it is a
non proﬁtable activity, the producer is not motivated to collect the expired medica-
tions by herself. Instead, she contracts with one or more 3PL companies to collect the
expired items at customer zones by oﬀering non-negotiable collecting fees. Thereafter,
3PL companies collect the medications and ship them to one of the governmental safe
disposal sites. Consequently, the producer pays disposal fees to the government for
those shipped items.
It is worth mentioning that depending on the collecting fees oﬀered by the pro-
ducer, 3PL companies might only collect a percentage of the available leftovers accord-
ing to their own proﬁt margins. If we look at the archival data of the pharmaceutical
producer under investigation, we can notice that the collecting fees that are paid
currently to 3PL companies are insuﬃcient. In other words, about 20% to 40% of the
available unwanted medications remain uncollected. Leaving expired medications at
customer zones and disposing them improperly (e.g., thrown away in water resources),
lead to penalties that must be paid by the producer to the government. Furthermore,
this puts company's reputation in the market in peril due to the negative environ-
mental footprint of her products. Therefore, new strategies have to be implemented
to ensure the RSC eﬀectiveness and to reduce the negative environmental impacts.
Against the current reactive approach in collecting unwanted medications, in this
article, we propose a proactive approach. It involves oﬀering incentives to customers
to encourage them to return those medications that have high stock levels and less
demand before their expiry date. By involving customers in the recovery process,
medications could be collected in a suﬃcient time to expiry date. Hence, they could
be donated or sold in subsidiary markets. The idea is to have more eﬃcient and
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sustainable RSC by involving customers in the recovery process [43]. In other words,
these alternative reduces the risk of medical traces in groundwater by decreasing the
quantity of medications that are landﬁlled while ensuring humanitarian aid. Besides,
producers can earn revenue by selling the unexpired medications in subsidiary markets
and beneﬁt from tax deductions after donating them to developing countries.
To achieve this, we propose two coordination schemes between the pharmaceutical
producer, the 3PL companies, and the customers. They have been modeled by the
aid of nonlinear mathematical programming to reﬂect the decision-making process
of the pharmaceutical RSC under study. While the ﬁrst model is mainly focused
on producer-customer coordination, the second one incorporates a negotiation mech-
anism to the ﬁrst model in order to motivate 3PL companies to collect the total
amount of leftover medications at customer zones. Finally, in order to reward the
3PL coordination eﬀorts, we propose a procedure for sharing the expected savings in
the enhanced RSC. To the best of our knowledge, this study is the ﬁrst contribution
to the literature that develops a coordination mechanism among all entities of RSC
(i.e., customer, producer, and 3PL companies) in the pharmaceutical industry.
Our experimental results on a real case study reveal the importance of ensuring
customers' coordination in increasing the return volume up to 6.5% while creating
extra revenue/tax deduction for the producer. Furthermore, by implementing the
proposed negotiation mechanism with 3PL companies, all leftovers can be collected
at customer zones, hence no more penalties will be paid to the government. The
cost of such coordination for the company would incorporate the incentive paid to
customers, increased collection fees, as well as a portion of the savings that would
have to be paid to 3PL companies. In return, adopting sustainable practices, such
as the safe disposal of expired medications and regulated redistribution of unexpired
ones to developing countries, is expected to improve the company's image in the
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market. Furthermore, the proposed producer-customer coordination has ﬁnancial
beneﬁts for the producer as opposed to the current practice where the disposal of
expired medications has no cash return.
This paper is structured as follows. A brief summary of the literature related
to RSC coordination is given in section 3.3. In section 3.4, the description of the
case study context and two diﬀerent coordination models are proposed. Numerical
results for each model are presented in 3.5. Finally, concluding remarks and future
recommendations are provided in section 3.6.
3.3 Literature Review
With the imposed environmental regulations, a stream of research has been focused
on involving the recovery process in supply chain practices [17]. For example, de-
tailed reviews on RSC models can be found in [15, 16]. Knowing that supply chains
inherently involve multiple independent decision-makers, proﬁtable solutions for ev-
ery member are complicated and seldom to be obtained unless a proper coordination
mechanism is utilized. A coordination mechanism can be used to conquer the anti-
trust problems, loss of control, the uncertainty about local policies, the variability of
a returned product quality, etc [27].
Camarinha-Motas et al. [26] reviewed the key concepts, classiﬁcations, and some
applications related to supply chain coordination. Kanda et al. [40] presented a
holistic review of the available literature prior to 2008 on the supply chain coordina-
tion. According to the authors, coordination mechanisms for supply chains can be
achieved through (1) supply chain contracts, (2) information technology, (3) informa-
tion sharing, or (4) joint decision making. Many papers in the available literature on
coordination mechanisms deal with forward supply chains and focus on coordinative
contracts, such as revenue-sharing [8, 12, 44], buyback contracts [45], and quantity
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discounts [33]. In particular, if we look at the revenue-sharing techniques investigated,
Cachon and Lariviere [44] studied the eﬀect of revenue-sharing on the supply chain
performance. They highlighted the limitations of revenue-sharing contract, such as
the administrative burden it imposes on supply chain entities. Cao et al. [46] imple-
mented a revenue-sharing contract to coordinate a decentralized supply chain for one
manufacturer and multiple retailers. Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo [12] proposed
another revenue-sharing contract to coordinate a three-stage model. By tuning the
contract parameters, they could achieve supply chain's eﬃciency and improve the
proﬁts of all the entities. Recently, Du et al. [47] studied a two-echelon supply chain
coordinated by a credit payment and a wholesale price discount oﬀer. Their results
lead to the determination of the retail price and the quantity to order by a buyer, as
well as the wholesale discount for the supplier.
A part of the literature also considers negotiation as a coordination method. For
example, Dudek and Stadtler [30, 31] proposed negotiation models for two indepen-
dent supply chain partners. Their results stated that using coordinative mechanisms
could improve the overall performance of a forward supply chain. Jung et al. [29]
proposed a negotiation process for a distributor and a manufacturer. The coordi-
nation was directed by the distributor. They aimed at ﬁnding a feasible plan for
supply quantities from the manufacturer to the distributor with a minimum amount
of information revelation to partners.
As aforementioned, the coordination in RSC is troublesome due to the uncertain
quality of the returns, the associated costs, the volume of returns, etc [15]. Therefore,
the relevant literature on coordination in RSC is very recent and limited to few of the
coordination mechanisms already implemented for the forward supply chains, such as
revenue-sharing contracts.
Due to the proﬁtability of recovery practices in electronics industry, the majority
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of articles on RSC coordination are focused on this industry. Very recently, Govindan
and Popiuc [42] investigated two and three-echelon RSCs for the personal computer
industry. They coordinated the network through the implementation of revenue-
sharing contracts. Moreover, the authors suggested discounts to the RSC customers
to return obsolete units. Their results stated that RSC performance and total proﬁt
could be improved through revenue-sharing and customer incentives contracts. Kul-
shreshthaa and Sarangib [48] investigated the eﬀect of oﬀering deposit-refund scheme
to promote the return and reuse of product packages. The refund is deducted from
a deposit that is added to the price of the product and is known at the time of pur-
chase. More precisely, the company chooses a price for a product and oﬀers a refund
for the same product at the time of purchasing. Walther et al. [37] developed a de-
centralized negotiation model to enable allocating product recovery tasks to recycling
companies in the electronic industry. Their negotiation model enables the generation
of contracts between the RSC entities which consist of masses to collect and recycle,
as well as transfer prices to pay.
In contrary, due to the particularities of the pharmaceutical RSC, such as the null
salvage value of medication recovery and the associated costs, the available literature
on this RSC is mainly limited to theoretical frameworks for such supply chains. For
example, Kumar et al. [10] proposed a framework to state each party's responsibility
in the pharmaceutical RSC. Xie and Breen [7] designed a green pharmaceutical supply
chain model to reduce preventable pharmaceutical waste. The study revealed that the
RSC practices are hard to implement in the pharmaceutical industry since returned
medications cannot be reused or resold.
Lately, Weraikat et al. [49] proposed a negotiation mechanism in order to co-
ordinate the recovery process between a producer and 3PL companies in the phar-
maceutical RSC. They also proposed a mechanism for sharing the savings of such
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coordination among RSC entities. However, their approach is based on the current
situation of the industry where all leftover medications are remained at customer
zones to expire. Therefore, in this article, we propose involving customers in the
coordination process of the RSC and encouraging them to participate in the process.
By including customers in the recovery process, the producer could collect more of
the unexpired medications, then donate or sell them in subsidiary markets.
3.4 Pharmaceutical RSC coordination models
In this section, we ﬁrst provide a brief description of the current RSC structure in
the pharmaceutical company under discussion, Generic PharmaX ; then we provide
the producer-customer and producer-customer-3PL coordination models developed
for better coordinating the RSC and ensuring full medication recovery.
As aforementioned, hospitals and pharmacies keep the medications to expire at
their sites, then they inform the producer about the quantities available. Since the
collecting process is not one of the core functions for Generic PharmaX, she con-
tracts with 3PL companies to pick up the leftover medications at customer zones. In
turn, 3PL companies send the medications to the governmental disposal sites. Con-
sequently, the producer needs to pay fees to the government for the disposed med-
ications. Moreover, she is obligated to pay penalties for uncollected medications at
customer zones. Figure 4 visualizes the current RSC practices in Generic PharmaX.
3.4.1 Producer-customer coordination scheme
According to Generic PharmaX, there are always some amounts of medication at
customer zones that are at risk of being expired due to low demand. If such medica-
tions are collected at a suﬃcient time before the expiry date, they can be resold in
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Figure 4: The current RSC of Generic PharmaX
subsidiary markets or be donated. In the latter case, the producer can beneﬁt from
tax deductions while the former option creates revenue for the company.
In the ﬁrst coordination model, we suggest to pay incentives to customers in order
to encourage them to collaborate and to return unwanted medications that have not
yet reached their expiry dates. The suggested incentives are oﬀered with respect to
shelf-life of the collected medications. The following categories are considered for
classifying the unwanted medications:
1. Category A represents the medications that have a shelf-life of two years or
more. The producer can resell these medications in a subsidiary market at a
selling price less than the price of a new medication;
2. Category B represents the medications that have less than two years and more
than a year shelf-life. The producer can donate these medications to developing
countries and hence, beneﬁt from tax deductions;
3. Category C represents medications with the expiry date of less than or equal
to one year from the collecting date. In this case, the medication is safely
disposed at one of the governmental sites.
Knowing that there are always chances to use the unexpired medications, it is a recon-
dite judgment for customers to think about these medications as unwanted products.
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Hence, customers might be averse to give back the medications that are from cate-
gories A and B. Therefore, to reﬂect the reality, we introduce customer willingnesses
to return medications from these two categories. We deﬁne customer willingness as
the ratio of the incentive that the producer oﬀers to customers over an incentive
threshold (denoted as dmax) that is imposed by the customer. If the producer could
provide that threshold, the customers would return the total available amounts of
that category, i.e., the customer willingness to return would be 1. It is noteworthy
that many factors aﬀect the value of the customer incentive threshold such as the
criticality of that medication, its price, and the demand. Nonetheless, the producer
cannot pay incentives to customers greater than products prices in subsidiary markets
for medications in category A or the amounts of tax deduction for returning medica-
tions in category B. Hence, customer willingness will always take a value less than
or equal to 1. On the other hand, sorting and keeping track of the unexpired medica-
tions involve extra cost for the customers. Therefore, they request a minimum value
for the incentives oﬀered in order to collaborate and return part of such medications.
This lower bound is denoted as dmin for both categories.
The proposed producer-customer coordination model is shown in ﬁgure 5. The
ﬁgure illustrates that the producer oﬀers incentives to customers for medications in
categories A and B. Furthermore, the producer contracts with the 3PL companies
to collect the medications, where collecting fees are non-negotiable. The 3PL compa-
nies collect and sort the medications with respect to expiry-dates. Medications from
category C are sent directly to governmental disposal sites, where the rest of the med-
ications are sent to the producer. The producer sells medications of category A in
subsidiary markets and donates the medications from category B to some developing
countries.
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Figure 5: A producer-customer coordination RSC
Producer-customer coordination model
In what follows, we provide the nonlinear mathematical programming model proposed
in this article, in order to formulate the producer-customer coordination scheme in
the pharmaceutical RSC under discussion.
Notations
Index sets :
i: index of medications, i ∈ I;
k: index of customers, k ∈ K;
j: index of 3PL companies, j ∈ J ;
The producers' parameters :
Pi: the selling price of a medication type i at a subsidiary market ($);
TXi: the monetary deductive value from the producer's tax if she donates a unit of
medication type i ($);
CDi: the obligatory disposal fees by governments for each unit of medication type i
sent to governmental disposal sinks ($);
Mi: the transportation cost of shipping a unit of medication type i to a subsidiary
market ($);
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α: the available percentage of medications in category A;
β: the available percentage of medications in category B;
γ: the available percentage of medications in category C;
φi: the penalties enforced by governments for each unit of uncollected medication
type i ($);
Aik: total mass of medication type i that is potentially available to be collected at
customer zone k;
The customers' parameters :
dmmaxi : the threshold of incentive that a customer requests in order to return all of
the medication type i in category A ($);
ddmaxi : the threshold of incentive that a customer requests in order to return all of
the medication type i in category B ($);
dmmini : the minimum incentive a customer requests in order to collaborate and return
a medication type i in category A ($);
ddmini : the minimum incentive customers requests in order to collaborate and return
a medication type i in category B ($);
The 3PL companies' parameters
Sij: collecting and sorting costs incurred by 3PL company j for each unit of medica-
tion type i ($);
TSij: unit transportation cost of medication type i from 3PL company j to safe dis-
posal sites ($);
TCij: unit transportation cost of medication type i from 3PL company j to the pro-
ducer ($);
Dj: collecting and sorting capacity of 3PL company j ($)
Decision variables:
dmi: the incentive the producer oﬀers to customers for returned medication type i in
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category A ($);
ddi: the incentive the producer oﬀers to customers for returned medication type i in
category B ($);
Qmikj: the collected amount of medications type i from category A by 3PL company
j at customer zone k;
Qdikj: the collected amount of medications type i from category B by 3PL company
j at customer zone k;
Qsikj: the collected amount of medications type i from category C by 3PL company
j at customer zone k;
QEMik : the uncollected amount of medications type i from category A at customer
zones k;
QEDik : the uncollected amount of medications type i from category B at customer
zones k;
QESik : the uncollected amount of medications type i from category C at customer
zones k;
ωmi : customers' willingness to return medications of type i from category A expressed
as ratio of the incentive value oﬀered by the producer to the customer incentive
thresholds (ωmi = dmi/dm
max
i , where 0 ≤ ωmi ≤ 1);
ωdi : customers' willingness to return medications of type i from category B expressed
as ratio of the incentive value oﬀered by the producer to the customer incentive
thresholds (ωdi = ddi/dd
max
i , where 0 ≤ ωdi ≤ 1).
The nonlinear mathematical model that represents the producer-customer coor-
dination scheme is provided in equations (24)-(35) as follows.
The objective function is shown in equation (24). It represents the proﬁt of the
RSC determined as the revenues minus the costs and denoted as ZRSC . The revenue
involves the revenue of selling the returned medications at subsidiary markets and
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the monetary tax deduction after donating collected medications. The costs include
the disposal fees paid to the government, the transportation cost to the subsidiary
market, the incentives paid to customers, the penalties paid to the government for
the uncollected amounts of categories B and C, the collecting and sorting costs,











































































The objective function is constrained by the amounts of medications that are
potentially available at customer zones to be collected. The available amounts at




(Qmikj +Qdikj +Qsikj) +QEMik +QEDik +QESik , ∀i ∈ I,∀k ∈ K
(25)
As mentioned earlier, the quantities of collected medications from category A are
aﬀected by the willingness of customers to collaborate and by the available amounts
from that category (constraint 26). Moreover, medications from the same category
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are either collected or uncollected as depicted in constraint (27).
∑
j∈J




Qmikj +QEMik , ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K (27)
By the same token, the collected medications from category B are aﬀected by the
willingness of customers to collaborate and by the available amounts from that cat-
egory (constraint 28). Constraint (29) reﬂects the fact that the available amounts
from category B can be collected or uncollected.
∑
j∈J




Qdikj +QEDik , ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K (29)
For category C medications, constraint (30) expresses the fact that the collected
amounts from this category cannot exceed the available medications from the same
category. Constraint (31) reﬂects possible options for the available amounts from
category C, i.e., to be collected or uncollected.
∑
j∈J




QSikj +QESik , ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K (31)
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The customer incentive thresholds for the medications from categories A and B are
given in constraints (32) and (33).
dmmini ≤ dmi ≤ dmmaxi , ∀i ∈ I (32)
ddmini ≤ ddi ≤ ddmaxi , ∀i ∈ I (33)
Constraint (34) indicates that the collected medications from all categories by each





Sij.(Qmikj +Qsikj +Qdikj) ≤ Dj, ∀j ∈ J (34)
Finally, domain constraints are provided in (35).
dmi, ddi, Qmikj, Qdikj, Qsikj, QEMik , QEDik , QESik ≥ 0, ∀j ∈ J (35)
3.4.2 Producer-customer-3PL coordination scheme
In the producer-customer coordination scheme, provided in 3.4.1, oﬀering incentives
to customers might be enough to motivate them to inform the producer regarding
the amounts of available unwanted/unexpired medications. However, it does not
necessarily guarantee the complete collection of such leftovers by 3PL companies due
to the non-negotiable collecting fees oﬀered by the producer. In order to solve this
issue, a negotiation mechanism between the producer and 3PL companies is proposed.
Figure 6 visualizes the producer-customer-3PL coordination scheme. In order
to motivate the 3PL companies to collect all of the available leftover medications at
customer zones, we propose that the producer negotiates with the 3PL companies over
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contracts' parameters, i.e., collecting fees oﬀered by the producer and the quantities
that must be collected by 3PL companies. Once the producer and 3PL companies
reach to a contract all agree on, the 3PL companies pick up the medications from the
three diﬀerent categories.
Figure 6: Producer-customer-3PL coordination RSC
This negotiation mechanism is summarized in ﬁgure 7. The producer leads the
negotiation process and oﬀers collecting fees to 3PL companies. We assume that
the producer delegates the responsibility of oﬀering incentives to customers to 3PLs.
In other words, part of the collecting fees that are oﬀered by the producer must
be paid to customers as incentive in order to return medications from categories A
and B. This assumption is essential in order to represent the proposed negotiation
mechanism as a mathematical model. After receiving contract parameters, each 3PL
company determines the incentive that must be oﬀered to customers as well as the
quantities that can be collected from all categories with respect to its capacity and
proﬁt margins. Afterwards, the producer will be informed regarding 3PLs decisions.
It is evident that if the incentives oﬀered to customers are not attractive enough, only
part of medications from categories A and B might be returned to 3PLs. In turn, the
producer checks the total amount collected from all 3PL companies. If not all of the
available medications are collected, the producer will revise the contract parameters.
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As summarized in ﬁgure 7, the oﬀers and reactions are exchanged until both parties
agreed upon customer incentives as well as collecting fees such that all available
medications are collected by 3PL companies. In what follows, this negotiation process
is mathematically represented by the aid of Lagrangian relaxation method.
Figure 7: The negotiation approach in the RSC
Producer-customer-3PL coordination model
In order to mathematically represent the above mentioned negotiation process, the
RSC coordination model (24)-(35) must be decomposed into "producer" and "3PLs"
sub-models. Inspired by [49], this decomposition can be implemented by the aid
of Lagrangian relaxation method [38, 39]. More speciﬁcally, by relaxing constraints
(25) to (31) that link the producer decisions to 3PL ones from the model (24)-(35)
and by penalizing their violation in the objective function with the aid of Lagrangian
multipliers, we obtain a RSC model that only involves 3PLs information and decisions.
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On the other hand, the producer will only need to verify the satisfaction of relaxed
constraints (25)-(31) that correspond to the collection of all available medications
at customer zones. In the case of violation of such constraints, penalties would be
calculated and new collecting fees would be oﬀered to 3PL companies accordingly.
In what follows, we provide mathematical models corresponding to the producer-
customer-3PL coordination scheme. In this negotiation model, the following notations
are used in addition to those provided in section 3.4.1.
Producer-customer-3PL coordination model extra notations
pimik : Lagrangian penalties corresponding to the uncollected mass unit of medication
type i in category A at customer zones k ($);
pidik: Lagrangian penalties corresponding to the uncollected mass unit of medication
type i in category B at customer zones k ($);
pisik: Lagrangian penalties corresponding to the uncollected mass unit of medication
type i in category B at customer zones k ($);
ik: collecting fees paid by the producer to 3PL companies to collect the medication
type i in category A at customer zones k ($);
ζik: collecting fees paid by the producer to 3PL companies to collect the medication
type i in category B at customer zones k ($);
ηik: collecting fees paid by the producer to 3PL companies to collect the medication
type i in category C at customer zones k ($);
ZLRC : the objective function of the RSC Lagrangian relaxation model;
Z3PL: the objective function of a 3PL company Lagrangian relaxation model.
As mentioned earlier, in order to extract the "3PLs" sub-models from model (24)-
(35), we relax constraints (25) to (31) and penalize their violation in the objective
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ik). Consequently, the RSC co-








































(φi − picik).γAik (36)
After reformulating the objective function (equation (36)) and the replacement of
(1) Pi−Mi−pimik = ik, (2) TXi−Mi +φi−pidik = ζik, and (3) −CDi−φi−pisik = ηik,
we obtain model (37) with respect to constraints (32) to (34), which correspond to







































(φi − picik).γAik (37)

























Sij.(Qmikj +Qsikj +Qdikj) ≤ Dj (39)
dmmini ≤ dmi ≤ dmmaxi ∀i ∈ I (40)
ddmini ≤ ddi ≤ ddmaxi ∀i ∈ I (41)
Qmikj, Qdikj, Qsikj, dmi, ddi ≥ 0 (42)
The negotiation process starts with initializing contract parameters by the producer,




ik), as well as the values of
the collecting fees (ik, ζik, ηik). In addition to that, the producer informs the 3PL
companies with these values. Each 3PL company solves model (38)-(42) and obtains
the customers incentives for categories A and B. Next, the amounts of medications
that can be collected and the incentives values that are oﬀered to customers are
presented to the producer. Afterwards, the producer checks constraints (25)-(31) to
make sure that all available medications have been collected. If some leftovers are
still uncollected, the producer revises those parameters and informs 3PL companies,
as visualized in ﬁgure 7. This process is repeated until all medications are collected
or constraints, i.e., (25)-(31) are satisﬁed.
As we are using a Lagrangian relaxation approach, a sub-gradient procedure is
utilized in order to update contract parameters (Lagrangian multipliers). For exam-
ple, in the RSC coordination model (ZLRC ), let pi
mt
ik be the value of pi
m





Qmtikj be the optimal value of
∑
j∈J




Qmtikj − ωmi .α.Aik ∀i ∈ I, ∀k ∈ K (43)
equation (43) represents the sub-gradient function of the corresponding relaxed con-
straint (constraint (26)) at pim
t
ik . In other words, g
t
pimik
is the violation of the relaxed
constraint in iteration t. As long as the relaxed constraint is unsatisﬁed, the new
Lagrangian multiplier (pimik) is calculated as follows:
pim
t+1






where µt is a positive scalar step size at iteration t and is calculated as µt = b/t||g||,
b is a scalar quantity and ||g|| is the Euclidean norm of the sub-gradient function.
Finally, we add constraints (45)-(47) to each 3PL company model (38)-(42) in
order to ensure that the maximum collected medication from each category is less
than or equal to that maximum limit for each category.
Qmikj ≤ Qmmaxikj ∀i, k, j (45)
Qdikj ≤ Qdmaxikj ∀i, k, j (46)
Qsikj ≤ Qsmaxikj ∀i, k, j (47)
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3.4.3 RSC coordination eﬀorts reward methodology
In order to encourage the 3PL companies to invest in the negotiation process while
supporting the coordination eﬀort, the producer is willing to share the monetary sav-
ings from penalties used to be paid to government for uncollected medications at
customer zones. Inspired by two recent articles [35, 49], sharing the savings is pro-
posed based on the investment of RSC entities (i.e., the producer and 3PL companies)
in the coordination model as follows.
1. Calculate the investment value (R) of the RSC entities in the negotiation model.
This can be calculated as the diﬀerence between the proﬁt value of each RSC
entity in the producer-customer-3PL coordination model and the current situ-
ation.







3. Calculate the share of each RSC entity from the savings (S) as:
S3PL = Saving.R
nor
3PL and SProducer = Saving.R
nor
Producer,
where Saving represents penalties the producer could save if all the expired
medications at customer zones are collected.
3.5 Numerical results and discussion
In the following, we extend the current RSC practices of Generic PharmaX to ﬁt the
models proposed in section 3.4. First, we describe the producer-customer coordination
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model results. Second, the results for the producer-customer-3PL coordination models
are presented. Afterwards, we compare the results of both models. Finally, the reward
of coordination eﬀorts is provided.
Parameters corresponding to the two proposed models such as diﬀerent costs and
fees were obtained through communication with the head of GenericPharmaX sup-
ply chain department. After reﬁning the data, four 3PL companies and four cus-
tomers were selected among the largest collectors and customers. Twenty types of
medications among the most important products were also selected from the producer
records.
3.5.1 Producer-customer coordination model results
In this section, we provide the results of implementing the producer-customer coor-
dination model on the case study described above. Also, we investigate the impact
of the percentage of available medications from each category and the customer in-
centive thresholds on the performance of RSC by the aid of design of experiments
(DOE) [50].
For this purpose, three factors were considered in the experimentation, i.e., (1)
the percentage of available medications from each category at customer zones, (2) the
customer incentive threshold for category A, and (3) the customer incentive threshold
for category B. Moreover, the most important key performance indicators (response
variables) for the producer incorporate the objective function value of model (48)-
(62) (RSC proﬁt), the amount of uncollected medications from category C, and the
customer willingness values for categories A and B.
Factor level combinations in the designed experiments are depicted in ﬁgure 8.
According to the producer, the most likely ratio for the available medications from
each category at customer zones is (10:20:70), i.e., 10% of the available amounts
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at customer zones are from category A, 20% are from category B, and 70% are
from category C. The customer incentive thresholds are considered as 50%, 70%,
100% of the medication prices in secondary markets and tax deduction amounts for
medications in categories A and B, respectively. The smallest incentive value required
by the customers to inform the producer about the available medications in categories
A and B (dmin) is considered as 20% of medication prices in subsidiary markets and
tax deduction amounts. Afterwards, model (24)-(35) was solved (by Cplex) for 27
Figure 8: Factor level combinations for producer-customer coordination model
iterations and the results are provided in table 9.
Minitab 16 was used to analyze the relationships between percentages of available
medication as well as the customer incentive thresholds and the RSC proﬁt. The
results reveal that the percentage of available medications from each category and the
customer incentive threshold for category A have signiﬁcant impact on the objective
function value (proﬁt). Also, the results display that the customer incentive threshold
for category B has no signiﬁcant impact on the proﬁt (i.e., medications donated to
developing countries). The reason can be due to small tax deduction amounts that the
government is willing to oﬀer to the producer for donating medications. Nevertheless,
such humanitarian aids would improve the producer's image in the market. Same
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Table 9: Some of the producer-customer coordination model results
dmax Category A= 50% Category A = 50% Category A =50%
dmax Category B = 50% Category B = 70% Category B = 100%
AMR∗ 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20
Objective value ($) 49,928.49 123,181.77 257,670.21 44,553.46 115,119.21 246,920.14 38,955.08 106,721.64 235,723.39
QEM (kg) 80.14 143.78 287.55 80.14 143.778 287.55 80.14 143.78 287.55
QED (kg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 164.26 246.39 328.51 1,242.83 1,864.24 2,485.66
QES (kg) 1,647.75 0.00 0.00 1,647.75 0.00 0.00 1,647.75 0.00 0.00
ωm 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.97
ωd 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.84 0.84 0.84
dmax Category A = 70% Category A = 70% Category A= 70%
dmax Category B = 50% Category B = 70% Category B = 100%
AMR∗ 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20
Objective value ($) 32,309.30 87,653.25 186,613.18 26,934.26 79,590.69 175,863.11 21,335.89 71,193.13 164,666.36
QEM (kg) 744.67 1,477.56 2,955.11 744.67 1,477.56 2,955.11 744.67 1,477.56 2,955.11
QED (kg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 164.26 246.39 328.51 1,242.83 1,864.24 2,485.66
QES (kg) 1,577.52 0.00 0.00 1,577.52 0.00 0.00 1,577.52 0.00 0.00
ωm 0.70 0.70 0.70 0.69 0.69 0.70 0.69 0.70 0.70
ωd 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.84 0.84 0.84
dmax Category A = 100% Category A = 100% Category A = 100%
dmax Category B = 50% Category B = 70% Category B = 100%
AMR∗ 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20 10:20:70 20:30:50 40:40:20
Objective value ($) 19,094.73 61,006.87 133,320.41 13,719.69 52,944.31 122,570.33 8,121.32 44,546.74 111,373.58
QEM (kg) 1,242.98 2,477.89 4,955.78 1,242.98 2,477.89 4,955.78 1,242.98 2,477.89 4,955.78
QED (kg) 0.00 0.00 0.00 164.26 246.39 328.51 1,242.83 1,864.24 2,485.66
QES (kg) 1,524.77 0.00 0.00 1,524.77 0.00 0.00 1,524.77 0.00 0.00
ωm 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.49
ωd 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.84 0.84 0.84
AMR∗: Available Medication Ratio
results were obtained from the main eﬀect plot, as shown in ﬁgure 9. Moreover, from
the interaction analysis between factors, we conclude that for a low level medication
ratio of category A (i.e., 10%), there is a slight negative eﬀect of the customer incentive
threshold on the proﬁt.
We ﬁrst discuss the impact of medication ratio and customer incentive thresholds
on the RSC proﬁt. As it can be observed in table 9, the proﬁt, as the ﬁrst response
in the analysis, increases when the percentage of available medications from category
C decreases (i.e., medications safely disposed at government sites). For example,
considering the case of 50% for customer incentive thresholds, when 20% of available
medications are from category C, the objective function value is higher than the case
where the percentage is 50% or 70% for the same category. This is mainly due to negli-
gible salvage value of returned medications in category C. In contrary, since returned
medications in category A can be sold at subsidiary markets, higher percentages of
category A increases the RSC proﬁt. On the other hand, our results reveal that the
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customer incentive threshold of medications in category A has a negative impact on
proﬁt. The reason is that higher incentive thresholds indicates customer reluctance in
returning medications. Hence, the producer needs to increase the incentives oﬀered
to customers in order to increase their willingness to return such medications. The
latter has a negative impact on the proﬁtability of the RSC.
Figure 9: The main eﬀects plot for the objective function- Minitab
Next, we look at the impact of the aforementioned factors on the amount of the
uncollected medication from category C, QESik . Considering the most realistic case
for percentage of available medications (i.e., 10:20:70), it can be said that regardless
the customer incentive threshold, the available medications from category C are not
completely collected, i.e., QEs 6= 0. In other words, introducing customer incentives is
not enough to ensure a full recovery when the majority of the available medications are
from category C, as also highlighted in table 9. In contrary, the oﬀered incentives have
been adequate for the recovery of all medications for the other percentages of available
medications (i.e., 20:30:50 and 40:40:20). However, knowing that the current average
total uncollected amounts is equal to 4, 292 units, it can be said that introducing
customer incentives could reduce that amount by up to 1, 524.77 units, i.e., 11.5%
reduction. Hence it can be concluded that the percentage of available medications
from each category has a negative signiﬁcant impact on the uncollected medications
from category C. However, the customer incentive threshold for category A has a
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slight signiﬁcant impact on the uncollected medications from category C. This comes
at no surprise, since the recovery process is less proﬁtable in the presence of higher
amounts of medications in category C no matter the value of customer willingness to
return medications in category A is. Moreover, the results state that the customer
incentive threshold for category B is insigniﬁcant, as shown in ﬁgure 10.
Figure 10: The main eﬀects plot for the uncollected medication in category C- Minitab
Finally, we analyze the impact of medication ratio and incentive thresholds on
customer willingness on returning those medications. As it can be observed in table 9,
increasing the customer incentive thresholds has a negative impact on the willingness
values and on the uncollected medications from diﬀerent categories. This means that
the producer is not willing to oﬀer incentives more than certain limits to make the
RSC more proﬁtable. Recall that the customer willingness is ω = d/dmax, where d
is the incentives oﬀered by the producer and dmax is the customer threshold. For
example, consider the case of 50% customer incentives, the average willingness of
category A is about 0.97 and 1.00 for category B. In other words, the producer is
willing to pay this threshold (which is equal to 50% of medication prices in subsidiary
markets). On the other hand, raising the customer incentive thresholds of category A
to 100% results in willingness values of 0.49 for the same category. This is because the
producer is not willing to pay more than 50% of the medications prices as incentives.
Furthermore, the uncollected amounts from categories A and B are higher when the
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willingness values decreases, as illustrated in table 9.
3.5.2 Producer-customer-3PL coordination model results
As demonstrated in section 3.5.1, introducing incentives to customers per se is not
enough to ensure complete collection of medications at customer zones. This is more
obvious when the majority of those medications are from category C, as shown in
table 9. The producer has to motivate the 3PL companies to go and pick up the
medications at customer zones. Because the current collecting fees are imposed by
the producer, the 3PL companies could be willing to collect more medications if the
collecting fees would rather reﬂect their eﬀort.
Therefore, the negotiation model proposed in section 3.4.2 is implemented to op-
timize the collecting fees as well as the amounts of collected medications by 3PL
companies. In this section, we consider the most realistic ratio of available medica-
tions (i. e. 10 : 20 : 70) for the producer-customer-3PL coordination model. Figure 11
demonstrates factor level combinations used to validate the producer-customer-3PL
coordination model.
Figure 11: Factor level combinations for for producer-customer-3PL coordination model
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We ﬁrst investigate the impact of customer incentive threshold on the 3PLs' proﬁt.
As it can be observed in table 10, higher customer incentive thresholds decreases the
3PL companies proﬁts. The reason is that in the case of high incentive threshold, it is
not proﬁtable for 3PL companies to oﬀer incentives close to that threshold. Hence, the
amount of returned medications in category A would decrease due to lower customer
willingness (table 10). Also, the third 3PL company could gain the best proﬁt in all
Table 10: Some of the producer-customer-3PL coordination model results
dmax Category A= 50% Category A = 70% Category A =100%
dmax Category B = 50% Category B = 70% Category B = 100%
3PL 1 Objective value ($) 46,367 44,173 42,568
3PL 2 Objective value ($) 52,505 54,282 50,426
3PL 3 Objective value ($) 68,807 68,366 63,414
3PL 4 Objective value ($) 58,689 60,076 58,387
QEM (kg) 0 0 0
QED (kg) 0 0 0
QES (kg) 0 0 0
ωm 0.20 0.20 0.20
ωd 0.40 0.40 0.20
cases. The reason can be due to high collecting capacity as well as low transportation
cost of this company.
Finally, we analyze the impact of incentive threshold on customer willingness.
As depicted in table 10, although in this coordination scheme, customer willingness
to return medications in categories A and B is reduced comparing to the former
coordination model (section 3.5.1), our results indicate that all available medications
that the customer is willing to returns are collected by 3PL companies. Hence, in
this case the producer would avoid paying penalties to government for uncollected
leftover medications at customer zones.
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3.5.3 Comparison between producer-customer and producer-
customer-3PL models
According to the case data, Generic PharmaX currently fails to collect 18% of leftover
medications at customer zones. Hence, she incurs legislative penalties. As our results
indicate, by introducing customer incentives, the uncollected medications could be
reduced up to 6.5%. Moreover, implementing the negotiation approach between the
producer and 3PL companies, in addition to the customer incentives, lessens the
percentage of the uncollected amounts to zero.
Table 11 summarizes the results for the percentage of uncollected medications as
well as the RSC proﬁt at the percentage of 10:20:70 over all categories and the worst
case regarding customer willingness to return medications in categories A and B (i.e.,
100%). The results for the other customer incentive thresholds are provided in the
Appendix. As stated earlier, proposing customer incentives reduces the penalties
paid for the uncollected medications. Yet, the incentives could not assure a complete
leftover medication recovery. With the aid of the negotiation process proposed in
section 3.4.2, not only the penalty could be eliminated, but also the overall RSC
proﬁt (equation 36) could be increased.











Current situation × × 18% - 93,000
Producer-customer * × 6.5% 8,121.32 9,991
Producer-customer-3PL * 0% 102,431.02 0
* The given values are for the case of 10:20:70 at 100% customer incentive thresholds for categories A and B
To implement the negotiation process, collaboration eﬀorts are required from 3PL
companies. Therefore, in the following section we present a technique to reward their
eﬀorts with respect to their investment in the customer-producer-3PL coordination
scheme.
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3.5.4 Sharing RSC coordination savings
The producer-customer-3PL coordination model for the customer incentive threshold
of 100% enhances the proﬁt of each 3PL company, as shown in table 12. The results
for the other customer incentive thresholds are visualized in ﬁgure 12 and ﬁgure 13.
At the same time, the producer could avoid huge penalties paid to governments by
collecting all leftover medications at customer zones. Nevertheless, the 3PL companies
have to invest time and eﬀorts in the negotiation process. Therefore, the Generic
PharmaX is willing to share a part of the expected savings with the 3PL companies.
Table 12: Proﬁt improvement with producer-customer-3PL coordination model (in $1,000)
Producer-customer-3PL Current The
coordination* situation diﬀerence
3PL 1 42,568.21 39,842.57 2,725.57
3PL 2 50,426.21 47,200.82 3,225.39
3PL 3 63,414.32 58,590.18 4,824.14
3PL 4 58,387.44 52,379.16 6,008.28
Producer -9,967.10 -17,915.13 7,948.03
* The given values are for the case of 10:20:70 at 100% customer incentive thresholds for categories A and B
Using the technique proposed in section 3.4.3, ﬁgures 12 and 13 visualize the
expected share of the savings between the producer and 3PL companies considering
diﬀerent customer incentive thresholds of categories A and B. For example, the
corresponding results to 50%-50% represent the RSC entities saving shares for the
case of 50% customer incentive thresholds for categories A and B, respectively. It
can be seen that the expected share of the savings for each 3PL company varies
with respect to its capacity to collect the available medications at customer zones.
The highest saving shares for 3PL companies are obtained at 70% customer incentive
thresholds for categories A and B.
On the other hand, the best expected share for the producer is when the customer
incentive thresholds are set at 50% for both categories A and B. In this case, the
collecting fees paid by the producer to 3PL companies are higher than the customer
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Figure 12: Saving shares for 3PL companies at diﬀerent customer incentive thresholds
($1,000)
Figure 13: Saving shares for the producer at diﬀerent customer incentive thresholds
($1,000)
incentives paid by 3PL companies to customers for returning medications in category
A.
To conclude, in one hand, 3PL companies would gain the maximum saving shares
when the customer incentive thresholds are set at 70% for both categories A and B. In
other words, 3PL companies need to negotiate with the customers for those thresholds
to obtain higher saving shares. On the other hand, the producer would gain more
saving shares when the customer incentive thresholds are set at 50%. However, any
threshold value could improve the producer sustainable image, in the sense that she




Governments' regulation on the pharmaceutical industry and customers attention to
sustainable practices all play a crucial role in changing the RSC practices in this
industry. Hence, pharmaceutical companies have to be proactive in addressing the
growing needs for improving their RSC performance.
This article proposed analytical models to support its objectives related to im-
proving RSC performance in this industry. First, an analytical model based on cus-
tomer incentives was proposed to encourage the RSC customers to return unexpired
medications. Second, another model was proposed to motivate 3PL companies and
customers to collaborate in the recovery process. Finally, the proposed models were
implemented for the real pharmaceutical company, Generic PharmaX.
The results demonstrated the improvement of the collected amounts of medi-
cations by introducing incentives to customers. Furthermore, by implementing the
negotiation model between the producer and 3PL companies, in addition to customers
incentives, all the available medications are collected. Knowing that the negotiation
process requires the commitment of RSC entities, such as cost and time investment,
a technique for sharing the savings was also provided to reward the investment of the
RSC entities.
This study is the ﬁrst to direct attention for involving customers in the recovery
process of the pharmaceutical products. With providing incentives, customers are
motivated to return medications prior to their expiry dates. Hence, the producer can
resell or donate the returned medications in subsidiary markets and gain monetary
proﬁts. In addition to the ﬁnancial beneﬁts, the producer would be step ahead of
her competitors in implementing sustainable RSC practices. In particular, selling the
medications instead of disposing them reduces the environmental harmful incineration
process.
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Future research would investigate the role of implementing a vendor-managed
inventory system at customer zones (i.e., hospitals and pharmacies) on reducing the
amount of eﬀort required for collection and disposition of leftover medications. The
idea is to reduce the amount of medications that reach their expiry dates. Cost/beneﬁt
implication of this coordination mechanism in addition to eﬀorts required by supply
chain entities in pharmaceutical industry would be worth being investigated.
3.7 Acknowledgment
The authors would like to thank the Fonds de Recherche du Québec - Nature et
Technologies (FRQNT) for the ﬁnancial support in this research project.
3.8 Appendix
Table 13: The averages of the uncollected medications and penalties for each model-











Current situation × × 18% - 93,000
Producer-customer × 6.8% 49,928.49 5,861.8
Producer-customer-3PL 0% 117,383.80 0
Table 14: The averages of the uncollected medications and penalties for each model-











Current situation × × 18% - 93,000
Producer-customer × 6.6% 26,934.26 5,602.59
Producer-customer-3PL 0% 111,438.16 0
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Chapter 4




This chapter is dedicated to the article entitles "Improving Sustainability in a Two-
level Pharmaceutical Supply Chain through Vendor-Managed Inventory System". It
has been submitted to the Journal of the Operational Research Society on September
2015. The titles, ﬁgures, and mathematical formulations have been revised to keep
the coherence through the thesis.
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4.1 Abstract
In the pharmaceutical industry, wide range of regulations have been imposed on
producers in the last decade to green their supply chains and to minimize the impact of
their medications unused or burnt in the environment. On the other hand, hospitals,
as the main consumers of medications, adopt a conservative inventory control policy
through keeping large quantities of drugs in stock. Given the perishable nature of
medications, such a strategy would lead to the expiration of excess inventory in the
absence of patients demand. Consequently, producers are faced with governmental
penalties and environmental reputation forfeit for their leftovers at customer sites.
This article aims at improving the sustainability of a pharmaceutical supply chain in a
real case study. An analytical model is proposed to explore the eﬀect of implementing
a Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) system on minimizing the quantity of expired
medications at customer zones. Results reveal that the amount of expired medications
could reach zero against the current 18% expiration rate of shipped items. Some
insights for VMI implementation are also provided.
4.2 Introduction
As the presence of pharmaceutical sediments in the environment and its negative im-
pact on humans' health are being revealed in recent years, many countries imposed
new regulations for tackling the pharmaceutical supply chain (PSC) recovery pro-
cesses [10]. Customers social pressure also plays a major role in determining corporate
sustainable strategies and performance measures. However, most of recovery actions
of PSC are still rudimentary and harmful to environment. Creative approaches are
therefore necessary to reduce or minimize the introduction of pharmaceutical wastes
to the environment and to improve the PSC sustainability.
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Medications, as any other perishable product, typically have a ﬁxed shelf life set
by a used-by or a sell-by date. They also contain active molecular ingredients that
degrade with time even when using modern keeping conditions [2]. These partic-
ularities lead to challenges on inventory control management, by trading oﬀ stock
outs and on-shelf availability against wastage due to expiry [3, 4]. Any shortage in
medications delivery has furthermore a high cost in terms of preventable illness and
death. Therefore, governments and customers (such as hospitals) might adopt a con-
servative inventory control policy by ordering more products to be hedged against
uncertainty [1]. For example, the federal government of the United States requires
large quantities of stock keeping units (SKUs) of medications as part of its strategic
national stockpile to protect its population in case of a health emergency [51]. Given
the perishable nature of medications, such a strategy would lead to the expiration of
the excess inventory in the absence of patients demand. In a 2003 survey, statistics
estimated that the cost for expiration of branded medications in the United States
drug stores was over 500 million dollars [52].
Since the medications salvage value is very low, pharmaceutical companies are not
motivated to invest in the recovery process for such products. On the other hand,
leaving expired medications at customer zones and disposing them improperly lead
to penalties that must be paid to governments. It might also turn into a jeopardy
to people's health if being redistributed illegally in undeveloped countries. This puts
producers' reputation in the market in peril due to the negative environmental foot-
print of their products. Therefore, improving the PSC sustainability eﬀectively is
essential not only to protect the environment and patients from exposing to expired
medications but also to reduce the associated cost [2].
Because of the aforementioned particularity, little attention has been addressed
to tackle the leftovers of this speciﬁc value chain. Most of the practices followed
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are to keep the unwanted/expired medications in conﬁned zones or to incinerate
them under the safeguard of governments. Such practices are more harmful to the
environment. Therefore, in recent works by Weraikat et al. [49, 53], diﬀerent ways are
presented to either facilitate the recovery of expired medications or to reduce their
amount at customer zones through proposing diﬀerent cooperative methods in PSC.
Nevertheless, the proposed approaches are post-solutions to the expired medications
problem in the PSC. In other words, they tackle the fact of typically having available
unwanted/expired medications at customer zones that have to be collected because
of a large SKUs strategy implementation.
Against the current reactive practices in collecting unwanted/expired medications,
we propose, in this article, a proactive approach by obstructing the entrance of ex-
cess medications to the supply chain inventories at ﬁrst place. This can be achieved
by implementing one of the most widely used initiatives for perishables dubbed as
Vendor-Managed Inventory (VMI) system. Implementing the VMI system requires
both information sharing and coordination between vendors and customers. The
vendor (usually the producer) is responsible for making decisions concerning replen-
ishment quantities and timing for its retailer (customer). The customer provides
the producer with access to its real-time inventory level physically or via electronic
messaging [54]. More precisely, the customer relinquishes control of replenishment de-
cisions and transfers ﬁnancial responsibility to the producer. It is worth mentioning
that producers are usually engaged in a such policy because of its beneﬁts. Irreg-
ular large demand orders from retailers are very expensive since producers need to
maintain excess items in stock to satisfy their customers' demand. Therefore, im-
plementing VMI system attenuates the ﬂuctuation in the customer's demand and,
hence, alleviates the bullwhip eﬀect [55].
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Along with the aforementioned advantages, our goal in implementing a VMI sys-
tem is to reduce the large quantities of expired medication at customer zones through
a more realistic inventory replenishment policy. As the main contribution in this
article, we propose a VMI model, from the producer perspective, between him and
one of his customers (a hospital). The model is a nonlinear mixed-integer program
(MINLP) that seeks the optimal quantity of medications that must be shipped to
the hospital in each period over a planning horizon with the goal of minimizing the
quantity of expired medications as well as shortage and inventory levels. Our exper-
imental results on a real case study reveal the importance of adopting a VMI system
in decreasing the amount of expired medications at the customer zone from 18% to no
expired medications of the shipped items. That is expected to improve the company's
sustainable image in the market.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. A brief summary of the
literature related to VMI and PSC inventory management is given in section 4.3. In
section 4.4, the description of the PSC under investigation and the VMI model is
provided. Numerical results and discussion of the model, in addition to managerial
insights of implementing the VMI system, are presented in 4.5. Finally, concluding
remarks and future recommendations are provided in section 4.6.
4.3 Literature Review
In this section, a concise review of the literature on the inventory management of
perishables is given. A brief summary about the relevant research on implementing
a VMI system, in general, and for PSC, in particular, is also provided.
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4.3.1 Inventory management models for perishables
The ﬁrst initial literature available on the perishable inventory management is chron-
icled by Nahmias [3]. The author gave a holistic review on perishable supply chains
and touched brieﬂy on applications of these models in blood bank inventory man-
agement. Goyal and Giri [56] provided a more recent review on the same topic and
items mentioned in [3]. Despite the similarities between the inventory management
of blood and pharmaceuticals, there are substantial diﬀerences between them. For
example, the shelf life of blood is technically 4-5 days, where pharmaceuticals have
varied shelf life from days to years. In addition to that, the replenishment lead time
of blood supply is shorter than pharmaceuticals. Furthermore, not every successful
technique for blood supply chain would be suitable for the PSC according to storage
and lead time otherness. Several studies have focused on the inventory management
of blood supply chains as [4, 5759]. An extensive review of the available literature
on inventory and supply chain management of blood products prior to 2012 can be
found in [60].
Chapman et al. [57] applied just-in-time (JIT) inventory management techniques
for a blood supply chain. Due to the consequences of an inventory shortage, the
authors concluded that the JIT technique is not suitable for such perishable sup-
ply chains. Haijema [4] addressed the importance of an optimal disposal policy in
combination with optimal ordering policies for blood supply chain. It was suggested
that the average costs of this supply chain could be reduced by selling old products
at a discounted price. Gunpinar and Centeno [58] proposed an integer programming
model to minimize the total cost of blood inventory system from a hospital perspective
over a planning horizon. The proposed inventory management approach could reduce
the wastage rates and cost in the hospital. Latterly, Civelek et al. [59] proposed an
inventory replenishment heuristic model to minimize the expected total cost over an
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inﬁnite time horizon for blood platelet supply chain. The authors suggested to per-
form the inventory replenishment with ﬁxed quantities. A First-In-First-Out (FIFO)
policy was also imposed by limiting some substitutions when making allocation de-
cisions according to a safety stock level. Önal et al. [61] considered an economic
lot-sizing problem for perishable products, where items have deterministic expiration
periods that depend on their procurement periods. Their model for a FIFO allocation
mechanism stated that the order of inventory consumption has a signiﬁcant impact
on the cost of the optimal plan of the supply chain.
Few research has been conducted on inventory management in the pharmaceutical
value chain. Uthayakumar and Priyan [1] developed a two-echelon PSC inventory
model to minimize the total cost of a supply chain that involves a pharmaceutical
company and a hospital. Lee et al. [62] studied a public pharmaceutical inventory
system with respect to the strategic national stockpile in the United States that
requires to maintain a high minimum inventory volume at all times. The authors
presented an optimal issuing policy for a deterministic demand to maximize the proﬁt
of the system they investigated.
It is worth mentioning that all of the contributions reviewed above has developed
inventory management models for perishable items with the goal of cost minimization.
In contrary, reducing the amount of expired items and their eﬀect on the environment
have been capturing less attention.
4.3.2 VMI systems
Since the ﬁrst adoption by Wal-Mart in 1980s, many articles treat VMI superiority
over traditional replenishment techniques for supply chains in general [6366]. For
more details on VMI beneﬁts, the reader is referred to [67]. Implementing VMI sys-
tem leads suppliers to a higher replenishment frequency with smaller replenishment
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quantities as stated by Dong and Dresner in [68]. Consequently, VMI system imple-
mentation leads to utmost inventory cost saving without negatively impacting the
overall performance of the supply chain or the customer service level [69, 70].
Very dearth literature can be found on implementing VMI systems for perishables
supply chains. The available research focus is on grocery industry or blood banks
but not on PSC. Ketzenberg and Ferguson [71] evaluated two structures in a grocery
supply chain. The authors tested the value of information sharing or centralized con-
trol in a VMI system relative to the case when no information is shared and decision
making is decentralized. Recently, Stanger [72] developed a seven-step framework for
the assessment of a VMI system implementation in a blood bank in Germany. The
author applied the proposed framework on 13 cases to conclude that hospitals hesitate
to enter a VMI relationship due to the fear of losing control over critical resources or
sharing information. However, this obstacle could be avoided by having explicit VMI
implementation steps, that clearly deﬁnes the responsibility of each entities involved.
The literature review summarized above clearly indicates the lack of application
of VMI systems in PSC. This article aims at developing an analytic model for the
implementation of VMI in this supply chain with the goal of reducing the leftovers
as well minimizing the total inventory and shortage costs of the supply chain.
4.4 Problem statement
In this section, we ﬁrst provide a brief description of the current PSC structure in the
company under discussion. Then, we extend the current value chain and construct
a multi-period, capacitated, ﬁnite-horizon VMI model for a two-echelon PSC, i.e., a
producer (Generic PharmaX ) and a customer (hospital). A mathematical model for
the proposed VMI system is then presented.
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4.4.1 Generic PharmaX supply chain
Generic PharmaX is a leading multinational pharmaceutical producer that was founded
in the Middle East 39 years ago. The company focuses on developing a branded phar-
maceuticals business across the Middle East, North Africa, Europe, and in the United
States. Based on purchasing orders received from hospitals, the producer ships his
medications with respect to the regulations in the destination countries. According
to the producer archival data, in some countries like the United States, large amounts
of the shipped medications expire in hospitals' stock. Upon their expiry, the hospitals
inform the producer about the quantities of the expired medications. Generic Phar-
maX, then, contracts with transportation providers to pick up those medications and
send them to governmental disposal sites. The producer is obligated to pay fees to
the government to safely dispose the wastage of medications. Currently, around 18%
of branded medications at customer sites are expired and must be collected, which
incurs penalties to the producer. Figure 14 visualizes the current PSC practice in
Generic PharmaX.
Figure 14: The current PSC of Generic PharmaX practice
Against the current practice, we believe that cutting oﬀ the SKUs level at hos-
pitals sites, without sacriﬁcing their customer demand satisfaction rate, is helpful
in improving the PSC sustainability. More precisely, reducing the inventory level
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can lessen the quantity of expired medications and their negative environmental im-
pact. In addition, the governmental fees and penalties could be avoided when an
eﬃcient inventory control management would be utilized. This can be achieved by
implementing a VMI system as explained in the following subsection.
4.4.2 Generic PharmaX VMI supply chain
The implementation of the VMI system requires private information sharing and a
certain level of trust between supply chain entities [73]. For this reason, only one key
hospital is elected to implement the VMI system with Generic PharmaX. Besides its
long-term relationship with the producer, it is chosen due to its high demand rate of
medications. Moreover, the hospital has high level of technology and infrastructure
that would facilitate the future implementation of a technological system supporting
VMI.
Considering the case where the producer and the hospital have agreed to imple-
ment the VMI system, Generic PharmaX is responsible for managing the hospital
inventory and creating its monthly replenishment orders. In addition, the producer
communicates with the hospital to decide on a minimum amount from each medi-
cation that has to be available in the hospital stock at all times, dubbed as safety
stock (SS) level. Some medications are essential because they can be life-saving, such
as respiratory and cardiovascular medicines. They have to be available in the hos-
pital stock at all times in adequate amounts. Therefore, the SS level of essential
medications is higher than nonessential medications as explained in the next section.
Having an access to the on-hand level inventory is also required in order to enable
the producer to provide on-site inventory planning.
Medications move from the producer, through a transportation provider, to the
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hospital site to satisfy its demand in each period of the planning horizon. The pro-
ducer issues a notiﬁcation of delivery to the hospital upon the shipment release in
stock. Given the perishable nature of medications, the producer checks their shelf
Figure 15: VMI supply chain Framework
life at the hospital site with every replenishment. Any medication that reaches to
the end of its shelf life is quarantined and then shipped to governmental safe disposal
sites, while unexpired medications remain at the hospital to be used in a next period.
Figure 15 depicts the PSC of Generic PharmaX under a VMI system.
Because of the criticality of medications, the demand of the hospital has to be
fulﬁlled by the producer over the planning horizon. Generic PharmaX managing
the inventory through the VMI system, he is obliged to pay monetary penalties to
the hospital for any shortage in the supply. The producer could also be coerced to
outsource that shortage with same or equivalent medications from another pharma-
ceutical company to satisfy the hospital demand. Besides, the following assumptions
are considered when formulating the VMI model; (1) the capacity of the producer is
limited for each type of medication in every period, (2) the hospital demand is fulﬁlled
with no time, i.e., lead time is zero, (3) the oldest medications are consumed ﬁrst,
i.e., a FIFO issuing policy is considered, (4) the producer ships only fresh medications
to the hospital, (5) ages and quantities of medications in the hospital stock at the
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beginning of the planning horizon are known, and (6) a SS level of medications has
to be fulﬁlled by the producer in every period.
4.4.3 Mathematical model for the VMI system in the PSC
In this subsection, we propose a mixed-integer nonlinear programming (MINLP)
model for implementing the VMI system in the PSC described previously. The no-




p: index of medications, p = 1, 2, ..., P ;
i: index of medication ages (in months), i = 1, 2, ..., I;
t: index of time periods (in months), t = 1, 2, ..., T ;
Parameters :
Op: unit cost of outsourced medication type p that the producer could not satisfy
($);
CDp: fees obligated by governments for each unit of medication type p disposed at
their sites ($);
TRp: unit transportation cost of medication type p shipped to the hospital ($);
TSp: unit transportation cost of expired medication type p sent to government dis-
posal site ($);
pip: penalty the producer pays to the hospital for each unit of shortage in the supply
of medication type p ($);
hp: unit holding cost of medication type p at the hospital site ($);
CAP pt : producer capacity of medication type p in period t;
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dpt : hospital demand of medication type p in period t;
SSp
min
t : minimum SS level at the hospital for medication type p in period t;
V Ipi1: the inventory level of product type p of age i at the beginning of the planning
horizon;
M : the upper bound on the inventory level of medications at the hospital site;
Decision variables:
Qpit: replenishment quantity of medication type p of age i shipped to the hospital in
period t;
Ept : quantity of expired medication type p sent to governmental disposal site in period
t;
Spt : shortage quantity of medication type p that is needed to be outsourced in period
t;
vpit: inventory level of medication type p of age i of period t;
F pit: binary variable that is equal to 1 when medication type p of age i is used to
satisfy the demand in period t, 0 otherwise;
Lpit: auxiliary variable associated with the medication age. It captures the number of
medications type p of age i in period t that left to be used for the next period if not
all medications from this age are used to satisfy the demand in the current period.
It should be noted that the VMI model has been formulated from the producer's
perspective. The objective function as shown in equation (48) seeks to minimize the
producer costs which involve shipping cost from the producer site to the hospital
site; expired medication costs which incorporate the safe disposal fees for expired
medication at government sites and the transportation cost from the hospital to the
safe disposal sites; the shortage costs that consist of the penalty paid by the producer
to the hospital for unsatisﬁed demand and the cost of satisfying that demand from




























The objective function is constrained by the capacity of the producer as shown in
equation (49). The medications from all ages shipped to the hospital in period t
cannot exceed the capacity of the producer in that period.
∑
i∈I
Qpit ≤ CAP pt , ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (49)
Also, medication shipped to the hospital should always be fresh, i.e., only medications
of age 1 are shipped to the hospital, as shown in constraint (50).
Qpit = 0, ∀i 6= 1, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (50)
The FIFO policy is depicted in constraint (51). Constraint (52) states that no medi-
cation of age zero is used to satisfy the demand.
F pit ≥ F p(i−1)t, ∀i ∈ I, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (51)
F p0t = 0, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (52)
Constraint (53) requires demand to be fully satisﬁed, otherwise a shortage occurs. In
fact, Lpit captures the number of medications type p of age i left in stock for the next
period when at least one item from that age is absorbed from inventory in period t.
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it − Lpit) + Spt , ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (53)







it) ≤ Spt , ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (54)
The inventory from diﬀerent ages available at the beginning of the planning horizon
is shown in constraint (55). Moreover, there are no medications of age zero in the
inventory at the hospital site, as shown in constraint (56).
vpi(0) = V I
p
i(0), ∀p ∈ P, ∀i ∈ I (55)
vp(0)t = 0, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (56)
Constraint (57) assures that the amount of medication type p of age i left in period t
do not exceed the number of the available medication of the same age in that period.
(F pit − F p(i−1)t)(vp(i−1)(t−1) +Qpit) ≥ Lpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (57)
Constraint (58) expresses the inventory update of medication type p of age i at the
end of period t. It simply indicates that medication type p of age i has been used to
satisfy the demand, in which case if medication of a younger age has also been used
to satisfy the demand, no more medications of age i will be left in stock. Otherwise,
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the leftover inventory of age i would be equal to Lit calculated in constraint (53).
vpit = (1− F pit)(vp(i−1)(t−1) +Qpit) + (F pit − F p(i−1)t)Lpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I
(58)





t , ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (59)
Constraint (60) captures the number of expired medications in stock that has to be
sent to the governmental safe disposal site.
Ept = v
p
(I)t, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (60)





it ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T, i ∈ I (61)
F pit ∈ {0, 1}, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T, i ∈ I (62)
Ept , S
p
t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T (63)
4.4.4 A solution methodology for the MINLP model corre-
sponding to the VMI system
In order to transform the MINLP model (48)-(63) into a linear one, the following
approach has been employed. In this method, the product of two variables (one
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binary and one continuous) are replaced by one new variable, on which a number of
constraints is appended to the rest set of constraints [74]. Let x1 be a binary variable
and x2 be a continuous variable with a known upper bound u. To linearize the product
of the two variables, a new variable, y, is introduced to replace the product of x1 and
x2, i.e., y = x1x2. In addition to that, the following constraints are imposed to force
y to take a value equal to x1x2:
y ≤ ux1
y ≥ x2 − u(1− x1)
y ≤ x2
y ≥ 0
By the same token, in model (48)-(63), consider the product of the binary variable
F pit and the continuous variable Q
p
it that appear in constraint (53). A new discrete




it. Constraints (92)-(95) are also added to the
model, as detailed in the Appendices.
After replacing all of the nonlinear terms in model (48)-(63) with linearized vari-
ables, constraints (53), (57), and (58) are represented by constraints (69), (73), and




























Qpit ≤ CAP pt , ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (65)
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Qpit = 0, ∀i 6= 1, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (66)
F pit ≥ F p(i−1)t, ∀i ∈ I, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (67)












it) ≤ Spt , ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (70)
vp(0)t = 0, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (71)
vpi(0) = V I
p
i(0), ∀p ∈ P, ∀i ∈ I (72)
γpit + α
p



















it ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T, i ∈ I (77)
F pit ∈ {0, 1}, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T, i ∈ I (78)
Ept , S
p
t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, t ∈ T (79)
and constraints (80)-(104) in the Appendices
4.5 Results and implementation insights
In this section, we present the case data and parameters used to solve the VMI model
(64)-(104). Some numerical results and sensitivity analysis are then provided. Finally,
managerial insights to help the producer and the hospital in implementing the VMI
system are proposed.
4.5.1 Case data and parameters
The parameters of the model were obtained through communication with the head
of the supply chain department in Generic PharmaX and then reﬁned as follows. It
is well known that VMI system is valuable only for high volume items and consistent
demand, which usually come from key customers [75]. Therefore, one of the producer
key hospitals was selected to implement the VMI model. The producers' sales of
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medications for the last three years were reviewed. Only the top 4 types of sold medi-
cations were selected. 2 out 4 medications were characterized as essential due to their
disease prevalence and life-saving eﬀectiveness; one from the respiratory medications
group and one from the cardiovascular medications group. The lifetime of medicines
usually varies from 24 to 36 months, therefore 24 months were considered for the
medications age. Medication shipped to the hospital is always fresh of 1 month age.
If the medication is kept unused, it would be of 2 month age in the next period. In
addition, 36 months is considered as the planning horizon. The upper bound on the
hospital inventory of medications, M , as well as the capacity of the producer were
considered based on archival data. Furthermore, purchasing orders from the hospital
on a monthly basis were revised and used in computing the hospital demand.
The criticality of medications was considered in calculating the SS level as follows.
For essential medications, the level was set as 5% of the hospital monthly demand
for that medication (i.e., deterministic demand). Otherwise, 2.5% of the demand was
used. Furthermore, to test the eﬀect of SS level on model (64)-(104), two diﬀerent SS
levels were generated and compared with the basic case. They are dubbed by low-
SS and high-SS. Table 15 summarizes the SS levels as a percentage of the hospital
demand for both essential and nonessential medications.
Table 15: SS levels as a percentage of the hospital demand (%)
Case Essential medications Nonessential medications
Basic case 5 2.5
Low-SS 2.5 1.25
High-SS 10 5
The capacity of the producer assigned for the hospital has a direct impact on
medication quantities shipped to the hospital. Therefore, two levels of allocated
capacity were issued and compared with the basic case to test the eﬀect on the
model; namely Low-Capacity and High-Capacity as provided in table 16.
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Table 16: Allocated capacity levels of the producer compared to basic case capacity




To analyze the eﬀect of freshness assumption on the expired medication quantities,
another case named as Freshness was considered (table 17).
Table 17: Scenarios for the Freshness of the shipped medications
Case Only fresh medications are shipped to the hospital
Basic case
Freshness ×
IBM ILOG CPLEX 12.3 was used on DELL VOSTRO 3450 with 2.30GHz CPU
and 4GB of RAM to solve the VMI supply chain model (64)-(104).
4.5.2 Numerical results
The model described by (64)-(104) was solved separately for each case using the
parameters mentioned in subsection 4.5.1. The average time CPLEX took to solve
these cases (except the Freshness case) is 267 seconds. The model solved for the
freshness case was model (64)-(104) without constraint (66), i.e., constraint guaranties
that medications are always fresh. The Freshness case has therefore higher solution
time than the other cases, which is 3807.95 seconds. The average optimality gap for
all cases is 0.1%.
Table 18 summarizes the results for the basic case. The objective function value,
as the total cost of the PSC, is given in the second row. It can be concluded that
shipping, holding, and shortage costs represent 34%, 33%, and 32% of the total
cost, respectively. The expired medication cost is zero since the expired medication
quantity at the hospital site is zero. More details for the basic case are provided in
the Appendices.
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Table 18: Solution results for the basic case
Total cost ($)




Expired medication costs 0
Total medication quantities (unit)
Shipping quantities 304,421
Shortage quantities 3,995
Expired medication quantities 0
As expounded in subsection 4.4.2, the percentage of expired branded medications
is currently 18% of the shipped items to the hospital. Implementing a VMI system,
in contrary, eliminates the medication expiration, as provided in table 18.
Sensitivity analysis
In this subsection, we aim at analyzing the impact of various SS levels, producer
capacities, and medication freshness condition on PSC costs following a VMI strategy.
Figure 16 depicts the comparison between the basic case and two SS levels. As
the SS level is decreased to the Low-SS, the total PSC cost decreases by 19%. Same
behavior was noted for the holding and shortage costs. This comes at no surprise, since
reducing the SS level reduces the total medication shortage and holding quantities by
16% and 43%, respectively, as provided in table 19. By the same token, increasing the
SS level to the High-SS increases the total PSC cost by 20%, the medication holding
quantities by 30%, and the shortage quantities by 15%. Given the signiﬁcant impact
of this constraint, the producer is instigated to review SS levels with the hospital and
update them periodically.
The allocated capacity level has a direct inﬂuence on the shortage costs as shown in
ﬁgure 17. As anticipated, reducing the producer capacity assigned for the hospital to
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Figure 16: Eﬀect of SS level on the various costs in the VMI model
Table 19: Eﬀect of SS level on the total medication quantities (Unit)
Basic case Low-SS High-SS
Holding quantities 11,236 6,392 16,056
Shortage quantities 3,995 3,354 4,665
the Low-Capacity increases the objective value by 92% since the outsourcing process
is very expensive, besides the penalties provoked. On the other hand, increasing the
producer capacity to High-Capacity could fully satisfy the hospital demand and ship
more medications as summarized in table 20. Therefore, the producer is advised to
boost his capacity assigned for this customer by 1.5 times the basic case capacity to
avoid expensive outsourcing and penalty cost, while ensuring greater service level.
Besides, with the reduced medication shortages, the producer not only saves but he
also receives more information on the hospital demand patterns that aids him in
better planning on his own inventories. It is note worthy that the expired medication
quantities under VMI model is zero for all cases.
Table 20: Eﬀect of allocated capacity levels on the total medication quantities (Unit)
Basic case Low-Capacity High-Capacity
Shipped quantities 304,421 153,294 308,447
Shortage quantities 3,995 136,362 0
Expired quantities 0 0 0
Regarding the freshness assumption in shipping medication to the hospital, model
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Figure 17: Eﬀect of allocated capacity levels on the various costs in the VMI model
(64)-(104) was solved after eliminating constraint (66) (i.e., allowing the producer
to ship less fresh medications). The results indicate that shipping aged medications
has low impact on the objective function and other costs (ﬁgure 18). However, it
increases the expired medication quantities by 545 unit (which is 0.18% of the shipped
medications) as shown in table 21. To improve his PSC sustainability, the producer
is therefore recommend to only ship fresh medications to the hospital.
Figure 18: Eﬀect of medications age shipped on the PSC costs
Table 21: Eﬀect of medications age shipped on the PSC medication quantities (unit)
Basic case Freshness
Quantity of shipped medications 304,421 304,711
Quantity of expired medication 0 545
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To conclude, implementing a VMI system could reduce the expired medication
percentage from 18% of shipped medications in the current status (extracted from
the producer archival data) to 0% for most of the cases. Allowing aged medications
being delivered would, on the other hand, lead to a certain expired medication level
to collect (i.e., 0.18% from the shipped medications). Therefore, it could certainly be
proﬁtable for the producer to implement the VMI system with his key customer while
shipping fresh medications. The level of the capacity allocated to this hospital should
be reviewed to avoid high outsourcing and penalty costs and poor service level.
4.5.3 Insights into VMI implementation
Despite the well-known beneﬁts, implementing a VMI system is not a straightforward
process. Sharing of data and information throughout the whole supply chain is a key
element of an eﬃcient implementation. As pointed out by Stanger [72], hospitals may
be afraid of losing control over their inventories. A solid base of trust between PSC
entities is therefore required. In this section we propose some steps and practical
procedures that would help the producer and the hospital to implement the VMI
model mentioned in section 4.4.
Figure 19 depicts the process of the inventory management by the producer at
the hospital, i.e., the VMI system. The implementation starts by a profound com-
munication between the producer and the hospital. The producer has to agree with
the hospital on the SS levels to manage for essential and nonessential medications.
These levels would change and be revised periodically with respect to the hospital's
demand and the emergency. The producer needs to know the actual level of inventory.
This can be accomplished via sending a sales representative to take a physical count
of medications on hand, sending inventory status via EDI or e-mails, or even using
compatible VMI software platforms at both PSC entities sites. The main feature of
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a VMI software is to enable the producer to get up-to-date inventory information as
often as desirable over the entire planning horizon. The expenses of the VMI software
can be covered by the savings expected in the safe disposal fees and penalties that
the producer used to pay to government for expired medications.
The producer checks whether any medication in stock is expired. If it is the case,
the expired medications are quarantined and then stock level is reﬁned. The expired
medications are sent to the governmental safe disposal sites using a transportation
provider. Based on the SS levels assigned for each item, Generic PharmaX calculates
the next replenishment quantity and issues replenishment plans. Once replenishment
plans are in place, the producer generates them into order plans. The orders must be
reviewed and approved by the producer, and perhaps the hospital, depending on their
preference. A summary report is issued based on parameters including lead-time (if
any), minimum safety stock, days of supply, initial inventory level, amount on-order
or in-transit, etc.
In out-of-stock situations, Generic PharmaX communicates with another phar-
maceutical company to fulﬁll the demand of the hospital with equivalent medications.
Equivalent medications may not always have the same treating eﬃciency like the orig-
inal ones. Besides, the price of the outsourced medications is usually more expensive
than the insourced. Therefore, a shortage penalty is paid by the producer to the
hospital for any shortage in the demand. The producer is also obliged to pay the
outsourcing expenses. It is noteworthy that shipping more frequently is the most
obvious leverage provided by VMI system, which will permit the producer to address
out-of-stock situations faster. The producer managers can then make adjustments
to the order and review the impact of these adjustments. Also, the hospital can re-
vise these adjustment through the software updates. Upon the shipment release, the
producer notiﬁes the hospital.
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Figure 19: Proposed VMI process between Generic PharmaX and the hospital
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On a periodic basis, performance indicators reﬂecting the actual results, such as
expired medications percentages, inventory turns, stock-outs, and days of supply, will
demonstrate whether the producer's control is suﬃciently proﬁtable for both PSC
entities. As a ﬁnal remark, beneﬁts gained from VMI system go beyond a simple
switchover. In other words, in a longer period when both Generic PharmaX and the
hospital adjust their eﬀorts to take advantage of this lower cost of inventory level
system, the ﬁnal satisfaction level will likely increase.
4.6 Conclusions and implications
Nowadays, improving the sustainability of PSC is a pressing need for pharmaceutical
companies. Governments impose strict legislations on producers to minimize the
introduction of their pharmaceutical waste into the environment. Typically, hospitals
follow a conservative inventory control policy, through large SKUs, since shortages of
essential medications have high costs in terms of preventable illness and death. Given
their perishable nature, signiﬁcant percentages of branded medications expired in
stock. Consequently, producers need to pick up these medication. Otherwise, they are
faced with governmental penalties and environmental reputation forfeit. Therefore,
an eﬃcient inventory management is required to reduce the SKUs level of medications
without scarifying the customer demand or aﬀecting human beings' lives.
In this article, we proposed a VMI model for the PSC, from the producer per-
spective, that seeks the optimal quantity of medications that must be shipped to the
hospital in each period over a planning horizon. The goal of the model is to mini-
mize medication shortage and the amount of expired medications. Our experimental
results on a real pharmaceutical company reveal the importance of adopting VMI sys-
tem for the PSC entities. Furthermore, the expired medication could be eliminated
against the current status, in which the quantity of expired medication is about 18%
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of shipped items.
A sensitivity analysis has also been provided to illustrate the eﬀect of SS level,
producer capacity, and medication freshness on the inventory control management.
From the results, we conclude that implementing a VMI system could help the pro-
ducer to improve the PSC sustainability and to avoid the expired medications at the
hospital site. On the other hand, the producer is recommend to increase his capacity
assigned to the hospital demand to fully satisfy the demand. In addition, the SS
level has signiﬁcant impact on the PSC total cost. Therefore, we advise the producer
to review SS levels with the hospital more often to make sure that right amount of
medications is kept in stock. Finally, the producer should only ship fresh medications
to avoid expired medication leftovers, which would improve his sustainability image.
The VMI system implementation, however, is not a straightforward process. A
key element in VMI system, that facilitates the implementation, concerns the sharing
of data and information. It is usually refused by the PSC entities due to fears of losing
control over their processes. For this purpose, we proposed some steps and practical
procedures that would help in the implementation of the VMI model between the
producer and one of his customer.
Although our model is representative of certain pharmaceutical value chains, we
recognize our results are limited due to the case study and the assumptions made.
In particular, demand is assumed to be known with certainty. In addition to that,
the costs are assumed to be unchangeable after implementing VMI system. In other
words, costs used to solve the model are the current cost before VMI system im-
plementation. Although these limitations aﬀect the amount of costs savings to be
realized from VMI system, we anticipate that the direction of the results should re-
main unchanged when these limitations are modiﬁed.
For future work, considering more medication types and more than a hospital
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can be suitable. In this case, eﬃcient solution algorithms for solving the resulting
large-scale MINLP model are necessary. Also, a replenishment lead time and its eﬀect
on the shipped medications quantities could be examined. VMI partnership may be
more beneﬁcial for one entity over other entities. Therefore, research on methods to
manage beneﬁts sharing among PSC entities would also be of practical value.
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4.8 Appendices





it imposes constraints (80), (81), and (83) to the model.
γpit ≤M.F pit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (80)
γpit ≤ vp(i−1)(t−1), ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (81)
γpit ≥M.(F pit − 1) + vp(i−1)(t−1), ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (82)






it imposes constraints (84), (85), and (87) to the model.
λpit ≤M.F pit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (84)
λpit ≤ Lpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (85)
λpit ≥M.(F pit − 1) + Lpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (86)





it requires adding constraints (88), (89), and (91) to the
model.
βpit ≤M.F p(i−1)t, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (88)
βpit ≤ Qpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (89)
βpit ≥M.(F p(i−1)t − 1) +Qpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (90)





it requires adding constraints (92), (93), and (95) to the model.
αpit ≤M.F pit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (92)
109
αpit ≤ Qpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (93)
αpit ≥M.(F pit − 1) +Qpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (94)





it requires adding constraints (96), (97), and (99) to the
model.
δpit ≤M.F p(i−1)t, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (96)
δpit ≤ Lpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (97)
δpit ≥M.(F p(i−1)t − 1) + Lpit, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (98)





(i−1)t imposes constraints (100), (101), and (104) to
the model.
µp(i−1)t ≤M.F p(i−1)t, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (100)
µp(i−1)t ≤ vp(i−1)(t−1), ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (101)
µp(i−1)t ≥M.(F p(i−1)t − 1) + vp(i−1)(t−1), ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (102)
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µp(0)t = 0, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T (103)
µp(i−1)t ≥ 0, ∀p ∈ P, ∀t ∈ T, ∀i ∈ I (104)
4.8.2 Basic Case results
Figure 20: Product 1 shipping quantities over planning horizon (unit)
Figure 21: Product 2 shipping quantities over planning horizon (unit)
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Figure 22: Product 3 shipping quantities over planning horizon (unit)
Figure 23: Product 4 shipping quantities over planning horizon (unit)
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Figure 24: Product 1 inventory level over planning horizon (unit)
Figure 25: Product 2 inventory level over planning horizon (unit)
113
Figure 26: Product 3 inventory level over planning horizon (unit)
Figure 27: Product 4 inventory level over planning horizon (unit)
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Figure 28: Shortage quantities for products over planning horizon (unit)
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Chapter 5
General Discussion and Conclusion
This thesis investigated some coordination mechanisms for a sustainable pharmaceu-
tical supply chain (PSC) management. A summary of the current supply chain for
a real case study was ﬁrst provided. Then, we touched brieﬂy on the environmental
provocations that pharmaceutical producers are nowadays faced with. Inspired by
traditional supply chain activities, we believe that implementing coordination mech-
anisms between supply chain entities could improve the sustainability of the PSC.
In the ﬁrst article, a decentralized negotiation process was presented in order
to coordinate the collection of unwanted medications at customer zones. Using a
Lagrangian relaxation method, the model is solved for a real generic pharmaceutical
company. Since coordination eﬀorts are required from the supply chain entities to
collect and recycle unwanted medications, a bonus sharing technique is proposed
based on each entity's investment in the coordination process. Results show that up
to 28% more products could be collected if companies coordinate their operations
eﬃciently. Hence, the producer would not pay penalties to the government and thus
improve its reputation in the market. At the same time, the proposed method for
sharing the savings leads to a win-win situation for the RSC entities, where each eﬀort
is rewarded.
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Alternative channels dealing with medication leftovers were investigated in the
second article. Two analytical models were therefore provided and implemented to
improve the pharmaceutical RSC performance of Generic PharmaX. The ﬁrst an-
alytical model focused on customer involvement by paying incentives to encourage
them to return unexpired medications. The second model was proposed to motivate
3PL companies and customers to collaborate in the recovery process. The results
manifested the importance of introducing incentives to customers in improving the
collected amounts of medications. Furthermore, utilizing a proper negotiation mecha-
nisms between the producer and 3PL companies, in addition to customers incentives,
could ensure a complete collection of unwanted medications. To motivate the RSC
entities in the coordination mechanism, a technique for sharing the savings was also
provided to reward the investment of the RSC entities.
In the third article, we focused on improving the sustainability of the PSC through
implementing a VMI system. An analytical model, from the producer perspective,
is therefore proposed to explore the eﬀect of VMI on minimizing the quantity of
expired medications at customer zones. Results reveal that the amount of expired
medications could reach zero against the current 18% expiration rate of shipped items.
The producer was recommend to increase his capacity assigned to his customer to
fully satisfy the demand. In addition, we advised the producer to review safety stock
levels with the hospital more often to make sure that the right amount of medications
is kept in stock. The results demonstrated that Generic PharmaX should only ship
fresh medications to avoid expired medication leftovers, which would improve his
sustainability image. Finally, in order to facilitate the VMI implementation, we
proposed some steps and practical procedures that would help in the implementation
of the VMI model proposed between the producer and one of his customers.
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5.1 Future insights
This dissertation, as a ﬁrst research on the pharmaceutical supply chain coordination,
contributes to the available literature by modeling this value chain in order to meet
environmental legislations and reduce the amount of wastes. However, it can be
improved by further suggestions as follows.
As explained earlier, the salvage value of medication recovery is almost negligible
in the pharmaceutical industry. Therefore, illustrating the impact of collaboration
in diﬀerent networks could be examined. In other words, comparing the proﬁt of
two networks: non-proﬁtable, such as pharmaceutical value chain, with proﬁtable
one, such as electronic or forest supply chain under various coordination mechanisms
would be worth investigated.
In the ﬁrst article, the model was proposed for a single-period tactical planning
model. Considering a multi-period model could also be investigated. In addition,
presenting some administrative insights for implementing the negotiation model could
be of practical value.
The analytical models presented in the second article focused only on coordination
approaches to encourage the RSC entities to return unexpired medications prior to the
expiration date. Therefore, cost/beneﬁt implication of these coordination mechanisms
in addition to eﬀorts required by supply chain entities in pharmaceutical industry
would be worth being investigated.
The third article dealt with one key customer and few number of medications.
Considering more medication types and more than a hospital can be suitable. Eﬃ-
cient solution algorithms for solving the resulting large-scale mixed-integer program-
ming model would be therefore necessary. Future research could also focus on the
replenishment lead time and its eﬀect on the shipped medications quantities. Finally,
research on methods to manage sharing of the beneﬁts from implementing a VMI
system among PSC entities could be examined.
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